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Documentary Disenfranchisement
Jessie Allen*
In the generay acceptedpictur of criminal drsenfranchisementin the United States
today permanent voting bans are rw. Laws on the books in most states now provide that
people with criminal convictions regain their voting nghts after serving thek sentences. This
Article argues that the legal realitymay be sjgniFwcanty different Interviews conducted with
county election officials in New York suggest that administrativepacticessometimes transform
temporary voting bans into hfelong disenfranchisement Such de facto pennanent dsenfianchisementhassignficantpolitical,legal,and culturalimplications.Politically it underminesthe
comforting story thatstates'legislativerefonshave ameloratedthe antidemocraticinteraction
of felony disenfanchisement and the 'ar on crime" high and racially dsproportionate
conviction rates. Even fconfinedto only a few states,permanent&senfranchisementia postwar-on-crme society may be politically significant in those junsdictions Legally such
disenranchisementchallenges the doctrinalimpenetrabilityof a United States Supreme Court
decision that has long blocked federal challenges to voting bans based on criminal conviction.
Culturally the local election practicesI describe revealsomething about the mle of wntten text
in our legal system. The pennanent enforcement of nominally temporary voting bans is
accomplished though election officials' demands for nonexistent eligibility documents from
people with cnininal convictions-the practice I call "documentary Asenfanchisement." I
prpose that those demands both refilect and construct a deep culturalundeistandingthat law
enacts status changes thmugh the vehicle of written tex4 changes that can only be undone by
more positive text This performative view of legal languageis recapitulatedinrecent federal
court decisions blocking challenges to felony disenfranchisement irmially those courts'
constitutionalinterpmtationslook more like the county election boards'demandsfor documents
than the reasoningofthe Suprme Courtdecision theypurportto follow
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INTRODUCTION

State laws that bar voting by people with criminal convictions
have resisted federal constitutional and Voting Rights Act (VRA)
challenges. But most states have reformed their laws, moving from
lifelong disenfranchisement to limited voting bans that expire with a
term of criminal punishment. Because the most serious antidemocratic effects stem from lifelong disenfranchisement, a reassuring story
can be told about the practice of felony disenfranchisement in the
twenty-first century. But that happy story is at best incomplete.
Interviews with local election officials show that disenfranchisement
laws that are temporary on paper are sometimes administered as
permanent bans. Such practices at first may seem unexceptional, but I
will argue that they have the potential to fundamentally change our
view of felony disenfranchisement in the United States today.
This Article makes three main claims. First, persistent permanent
disenfranchisement challenges the conventional wisdom about the
political implications of criminal voting bans and the significance of
recent legislative reforms. Second, felony disenfranchisement, as it is
being practiced today, may no longer be constitutionally protected by
long-standing United States Supreme Court precedent. Third, the
practices through which temporary criminal disenfranchisement
becomes permanent reveal something about how legal documents
work to transform social status.
Election officials demand unobtainable eligibility documents
from individuals seeking to reregister after being marked down as
ineligible while serving a prison sentence. Federal courts interpret the
express exemption of criminal disenfranchisement in an obscure
portion of the Fourteenth Amendment to preclude finding that racial
vote dilution caused by criminal disenfranchisement violates the VRA.
In both cases, government officials attach a kind of transformative
power to positive legal text-whether a judgment of conviction, a mark
on a voter registration list, or the words of the U.S. Constitution-that
trumps both the intentions of the text's authors and reasonable
understandings of the meaning of the relevant law.
It has been more than a decade since the 2000 election crisis in
Florida put felony disenfranchisement on the map. By conventional
estimates, more than five million Americans are disenfranchised by
state laws that deny voting rights on account of criminal conviction.'
1.

JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT:

MENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 248-50, tbl.A3.3 (2006).

FELON DISENFRANCHISE-
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That is only some 2% of the country's voting-age population, but
felony disenfranchisement is not evenly spread across the U.S.
electorate, either geographically or racially, and the effects of these
laws are greatly intensified in some communities. In particular, states
that practice permanent disenfranchisement cull much larger portions
of their electorates. When combined with the racially skewed
conviction rates of the "war on crime," permanent felony disenfranchisement can significantly deplete African-American voting power.'
In states where conviction triggers lifelong disenfranchisement, large
portions of the African-American community are barred from
voting-for example, 19% in Florida, 20% in Virginia, and 24% in
Kentucky.' As a result, criminal disenfranchisement can have
significant antidemocratic effects.'
In the last decade, six challenges to felony disenfranchisement
have reached federal courts of appeals.! All of them have failed.!
See id at 251-53, tbl.A3.4; see also Farrakhan v. Gregoire (FarakhanIII), 590
2.
E3d 989, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2010) ("The [district] court found that Plaintiffs' evidence of
discrimination in the criminal justice system, and the resulting disproportionate impact on
minority voting power, is compelling." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Pamela S. Karlan,
Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon
Disenfanchisemen4 56 STAN. L. REv. 1147, 1155-64 (2004); Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer,
The VanishingBlack Electorate: Felony DisenfranchisementinAdanta,Georgia,THE SENT'G
PROJECT (Sept. 2004), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd-vanishingblack
electorate.pdf.
The figures are as of 2004. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 1, at 251-53, tbl.A3.4.
3.
In the only other state with a blanket permanent ban on the books, Iowa, the proportion of
African Americans disenfranchised is a whopping 34% of the very small (about 43,000)
African-American voting-age population. Id at 251.
See, e.g., MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 1; Gabriel J. Chin, Felon Disenfranchise4.
ment and Democracy in the Late Jim CrowEra, 5 OHIo ST. J.CIM. L. 329 (2007); Alec C.
Ewald, "Civil Death" The IdeologicalParadox of CrnminalDisenfranchisementLaw in the
UnitedStates, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 1045; Karlan, supm note 2. But see Roger Clegg, George T
Conway III & Kenneth K. Lee, The CaseAgainst Felon Voting, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PuB.
PoL'Y 1 (2008).
Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 E3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010); Harvey v. Brewer, 605 E3d
5.
1067 (9th Cir. 2010); Simmons v. Galvin (Simmonsl), 652 E Supp. 2d 83 (D. Mass. 2007),
rev'd in part, remanded in part 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 412
(2010); Hayden v. Pataki (Hayden I), No. 00 Civ. 8586(LMM), 2004 WL 1335921 (S.D.N.Y.
June 14,2004), aff'andremanded449 E3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006), andaff'd andremandedsub
nom. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Governor of Florida
(Johnson 1), 353 E3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003), reh'g granted en banc, opimon vacated by, 377
E3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004), aff'g district court grant ofsummaryjudgmen4 405 E3d 1214
(1 1th Cir. 2005), cert. deniedsub nom. Johnson v. Bush, 546 U.S. 1015 (2005); Farrakhan v.
Washington (anakhan I), 338 E3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003), aff'g in part,rev'g in part,and
remanding to district cour4 359 E3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g denied affi sub nom.
Farrakhan v. Gregoire, No. CV-96-076-RHW, 2006 WL 1889273 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006),
rev'g and remandig to district cour, 590 E3d 989 (9th Cir. 2010), reh'g of circuit court
granted 603 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2010), andaff'den banc, 623 E3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010). Full
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During the same period, however, legislative and administrative reform
has accelerated. Since 2000, seven states have altered or abandoned
permanent disenfranchisement provisions to allow restoration of
voting rights to at least some people with felony convictions. Across
the country, public opinion polls show robust opposition to voting bans
that persist beyond a criminal sentence.! Perhaps unsurprisingly, then,
state legislatures and executives have converted policies of lifelong
disenfranchisement to temporary voting bans that expire upon
completion of a criminal sentence. Even Florida, for a time, reformed
its notorious policy, though the state subsequently reverted to a
permanent ban.' In 1974, when the Supreme Court upheld criminal
disenfranchisement, twenty-four states barred voting for life for
anyone with a felony conviction."o In 2000, there were fifteen states
that permanently disenfranchised at least some of those convicted."
Today only four states-Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, and Virginia-

disclosure: I was part of the legal team representing the plaintiffs in Johnson,the challenge to
Florida's disenfranchisement law, and I filed amicus briefs in Farakhan and Hayden,
challenges to Washington and New York laws, respectively.
6.
See Johnson, 624 F.3d 742; Farrakhan v. Gregoire (FarrakhanIV), 623 F.3d 990
(9th Cir. 2010); Harvey, 605 F.3d 1067; Hayden v. Paterson (Hayden 117), 594 F.3d 150 (2d
Cir. 2010); Simmons v. Galvin (Simmons II), 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009); Johnson v.
Governor of Florida (Johnson lH), 405 F3d 1214 (11 th Cir. 2005).
7.
Those states are Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
and Wyoming. Felony DisenfanchisementLaws in the United States,THE SENT'G PROJECT
(Mar. 2011), http://www.sentencingproject.org/detail/doc/publications/fd-bs-fdlawsinusMarl 1.
pdf [hereinafter FelonyDisenfranchisementLaws].
8.
See Jeff Manza, Clem Brooks & Christopher Uggen, Public Attitudes Toward
Felon Disenfranchisementin the United States, 68 PUB. OPINION Q. 275, 276, 280-81, 283
(2004) (finding 80% surveyed in favor of enfranchising ex-felons and approximately 60%
support for enfranchising probationers and parolees); see also Brian Pinaire, Milton
Heumann & Laura Bilotta, Barredfrom the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement ofFelons, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1519, 1540 (2003) (finding approximately 82%
support for reenfranchising ex-felons).
9.

FLA. PAROLE COMM'N, RULES OF ExEcuTivE CLEMENCY, available athttps://fpc.

state.fl.us/PDFs/clemency-rules.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2011). Iowa likewise switched from
a permanent to temporary ban and back again. Compare Iowa Exec. Order No. 42 (July 4,
2005), available at http://publication.iowa.gov/3762/l/EO_42.pdf (changing to a temporary
ban), with Iowa Exec. Order No. 70 (Jan. 14, 2011), availableathttp://publications.iowa.gov/
10194/1/Exec_Order_70.pdf (reverting back to a permanent ban).
10. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 83 n.28 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Note that at the time Richardson was decided, Florida, by executive order, provided for
automatic reenfranchisement upon completion of sentence.
11.
See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political
Consequences ofFelon Disenfranchisementin the United States,67 AM. Soc. REv 777, 797,
tbl.A (2002).
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maintain blanket permanent voting bans on the books.12 On paper, it
looks as though permanent felony disenfranchisement is a
disappearing relic of the past.
Not so fast. Interviews with local election administrators in New
York suggest that, in practice, felony disenfranchisement often remains
de facto permanent, even in states with temporary bans on the books."
Election boards return registration forms sent in by individuals who
are eligible to reregister and demand that prospective voters with
felony convictions produce documents to prove their eligibility,
documents that are always burdensome to obtain, and that, in many
cases, are entirely fictional, unavailable by law, or available only as a
matter of pure official discretion. 4 Moreover, observations and reports
from other jurisdictions suggest that this practice, which I call
"documentary disenfranchisement," may exist in other states as well."
This Article considers the legal, political, and cultural
implications that flow from local election officials' enforcement of
statutorily temporary felony-voting bans in ways that permanently bar
convicted citizens from voting. Of course this practice does not mean
that legislative reforms have no effect. But it may mean that those
reforms have not ameliorated the antidemocratic effects of permanent
disenfranchisement to the extent that has previously been assumed.
Where the kind of de facto permanent disenfranchisement I observed
in New York is practiced, communities have weakened electoral voices.
That is politically significant in those places, even if limited to just a
few jurisdictions. If the practice of documentary disenfranchisement is
more widespread, the total number of Americans locked out of the
polls by criminal voting bans may be much greater than the usual
estimate. What is more, locally-and perhaps nationally-felonyvoting bans may dilute African-American voting power to a much
greater extent even than voting rights advocates have claimed.
12. Felony DisenfranchisementLaws, supra note 7 (noting that in seven other states,
some individuals can still be disenfranchised for life, if convicted for certain offenses or
through multiple convictions).
13.
See Erika Wood & Rachel Bloom, De Facto Disenfranchisemen4 BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUST., 1 (2008), http://brennan.3cdn.net/578dl1c906d8ld548f Itm6iiqab.pdf,
Alex Shalom & Eric Randolph, NY State Ex-Felon Re-Enfranchisement Procedures Report
(2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
14. Shalom & Randolph, supranote 13, at 2.
15.
See Wood & Bloom, supra note 13, at 6; see also Letter from Denise Lieberman,
Senior Attorney, Advancement Project, and Anthony E. Rothert, Legal Dir., ACLU, to Scott
Leiendecker & Mary Wheeler-Jones, Dirs., St. Louis City Bd. of Election Comm'rs (Oct. 13,
2008), available at http://www.advancementproject.org/sites/default/files/publications/letterstlouis-election-board-2008.pdf.
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Beyond the political and legal effects of permanent felony-voting
bans, the phenomenon of documentary disenfranchisement illuminates
something about the nature of legal documents as disparate as
judgments of conviction, certificates of relief, voter registration
databases, and the U.S. Constitution. Our legal culture recognizes
various ways to interpret the meaning of legal texts, especially statutes
and constitutional provisions." In most considerations of interpretive
methodology, however, little attention has been paid to how we should
go about understanding what I would call the "performative force" of
legal documents, and, particularly, whether and how our understanding
of that aspect of legal text may interact with our interpretations of legal
text's meaning.
The philosopher J.L. Austin coined the term "performative" to
describe the capacity of language to perform an action. That is, in
saying something we may also be doing something-for instance,
promising, contracting, or marrying-through language alone." Many
of Austin's examples involved legal language, like "I give and
bequeath" or "guilty." Moreover, any statute, regulation, or constitutional provision definitionally has a particular performative force in
Austin's sense, because to be a legal rule, the text must do something:
that is, it must enact or regulate-as opposed merely to describesome legal protection, prohibition, or duty. Nevertheless, in the halfcentury since Austin identified this performative aspect of legal
language, very little attention has been paid to how the performative
force of legal text should be understood. The concept of performative
speech acts has been used to analyze the interaction of law and culture
and to investigate substantive legal norms relating to law's regulation
of speech in, for example, First Amendment doctrine, contract norms,
16. For instance, current members of the Supreme Court espouse different
interpretive approaches. Justice Antonin Scalia famously champions a textualist approach, in
which a law's applications are determined by the text's meaning at the time of its enactment,
and divined by considering only the enacted text's word choices, syntax, and structure.
ANIONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). In
contrast, Justice Steven Breyer advocates a pragmatic approach that eschews "any single
theory or grand view of law, of interpretation, or of the Constitution." STEPHEN BREYER,
MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S ViEw 80 (2010). Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice
Breyer would consider not only the text of the provision being interpreted, but also its
legislative history and any other relevant evidence regarding the original meaning of the
provision and how that meaning might apply in present day circumstances. Stephen Breyer,
On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpetingStatutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992).
But see Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2293 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The
Court's introduction of legislative history serves no purpose except needlessly to inject into
the opinion a mode of analysis that not all of the Justices consider valid.").
17.

See J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 9 (1962).
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and rules of evidence." But little has been written about the effect of
legal rules' performative force on legal administration or how our
understanding of a text's performative force relates to our interpretation of that text's meaning and its authors' intent.
In my view, the administration of felony disenfranchisement laws
presents an example of the role of legal text's performative force in
legal administration, albeit in a somewhat different sense than Austin
proposed. The enforcement of nominally temporary disenfranchisement as a permanent voting ban is accomplished through election
officials' demands for unobtainable eligibility documentation from
people with felony convictions. The officials frame their demands in
terms of proof of eligibility, that is, a demand for documents that
represent the would-be voters' eligibility. I propose, however, that
those documentary requests may be driven in part by the officials'
view of the performative power of the documents entailed in criminal
conviction. That is, officials may be seeking not only legal proof but
legal mechanisms of reenfranchisement.
Whereas Austin's work focused on the performative force of
particular utterances, here the legal documents themselves seem to be
invested with performative power, without regard to the particular
meaning or intent of their verbal contents. The state transforms
citizens into convicts through a process replete with formal written
papers-judgments of conviction, verdict sheets, plea agreements, and
sentencing reports. Local officials may assume that some other legal
text is needed to reverse that transformation and accomplish the move
back across the border between disenfranchised convict and voting
citizen. There is a sense that what has been done with documentary
text must likewise be undone with documentary text.
This sensitivity to the performative force of documentary text in
constructing and reinforcing the disenfranchised status of people with
felony convictions is not confined to local election administrators.
Indeed, it seems to be shared by a number of federal appellate courts in
18. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE
(1997). In a chapter entitled Burning Acts, Injudious Speech, Butler analyzes several
Supreme Court opinions dealing with "hate speech" and the First Amendment doctrine of
"fighting words" in terms of Austin's theory of performative speech. Id. at 43-69; see also
United States v. Montana, 199 E3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a hearsay challenge to
admission of testimony regarding a demand for money, explaining that as a "performative
utterance," the demand was not covered by the hearsay rule). Note, however, that the opinion
in Montana oddly mixes up the linguistic terminology, misusing the term "illocutionary" to
refer to what Austin called "constative" speech-that is, the kind of statement of truth value
ordinarily subject to hearsay limitations.
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protecting felony-voting bans from challenges under the VRA. Those
courts base their protection of state felony disenfranchisement laws on
the Fourteenth Amendment's express exemption of criminal
disenfranchisement from the interim penalty of reduced representation
in Congress. States that disenfranchised African Americans would
suffer reduced representation before the Fifteenth Amendment barred
outright race discrimination in voting. The courts of appeals put great
stock in the Constitution's "affirmative sanction" of criminal
disenfranchisement in the Fourteenth Amendment's Reduction in
Representation Clause. Indeed they effectively read that exemption to
preclude VRA claims of racial impact despite a Supreme Court
decision holding that intentionally discriminatory criminal
disenfranchisement violates the Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause."
Moreover, at least where permanent disenfranchisement is
concerned, the racial consequences of protecting criminal voting bans
contravene the primary goal of the very constitutional text on which
the courts rely-to prevent racial vote dilution. In this context, the
judicial holding that states' power to practice felony disenfranchisement is "fixed by the text"20 of an ancillary section of the Fourteenth
Amendment looks like another form of documentary disenfranchisement. Like the election administrators who assume that the
documentary rituals of criminal conviction and disenfranchisement
cannot be reversed without a textual certificate of eligibility, the courts
treat the reference to criminal disenfranchisement like a kind of
performative on-off switch. The constitutional exemption from an
interim political remedy functions like a kind of judgment of collective
conviction that is presumed to have ineluctably altered a group's social
status until some further affirmative text reverses or otherwise
transforms that status.
A note about methods and goals: through its combination of
empirical, doctrinal, and theoretical analysis, this Article aims to
19. FarrakhanIV 623 F3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2010); Hayden III, 594 F.3d 150, 164
(2d Cir. 2010); Simrons II, 575 E3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2009); Johnson 11 405 F3d 1214, 1225
(1Ith Cir. 2005). The courts of appeals are pulling the "affirmative sanction" language from
a line in a watershed Supreme Court case and focusing on that single textual point to the
exclusion of the opinion's overarching intentionalist analysis. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418
U.S. 24, 54 (1974) ("[T]he exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in
§ 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment."). Subsequent to Richardson, the Court decided Hunter v
Underwood 471 U.S. 222 (1985), laying to rest the notion that Richardsonprecluded equal
protection challenges to racially biased felony disenfi-anchisement.
20. Johnson 11 405 F3d at 1228 ("Most important, Florida's discretion to deny the
vote to convicted felons is fixed by the text of §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .").
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contribute to the growing field of scholarship known as "new legal
realism." As I understand it, new legal realist work examines how our
legal system functions as a system "of laws through men."2' The goal
is to steer a course between uncritical doctrinal reasoning and the
conviction of the original legal realists that legal doctrines and forms
are all an illusory cover for political power and thus of no interest in
understanding what is really going on. As Victoria Nourse and
Gregory Shaffer put it, new realists do not, or anyway should not,
"simply reject law's formal qualities as meaningless."22 The idea is
understanding how those forms are deployed to "develop a form of
reasoning" and assert "a particular kind of power."23 Methodologically,
an emphasis on law's social context, the use of empirical information
about "ground level" legal administration, and the attempt to explore
"the often-messy reality of law as it actually works" are all common
features of the new legal realist project.24 Whereas the original legal
realists generally sought to explain legal outcomes in terms of political,
economic, and personal factors as opposed to formal doctrinal
constraints, new legal realists tend to explore the interconnection of
formality and doctrine with other factors as different aspects of legal
decision making. I pursue this more holistic inquiry here by
examining how cultural understandings of legal forms, in particular the
power of written legal text, influence outcomes at multiple levels of the
legal system-from county election administration to federal courts'
constitutional analysis.
A repeated new legal realist theme is the need to find new ways
to integrate theory and empirical research, so that each informs the
other." In this Article, I respond to that challenge by theorizing a
connection between decision makers' approaches to legal text in two
Starting from election officials'
very different legal contexts.
I first offer a legal-cultural
applications,
responses to voter registration
explanation for these local administrative practices, and then apply that
same explanation to federal appellate judges' constitutional
interpretation in cases challenging state voting bans. County officials'
21.
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The NewLegalRealism, 75 U. Cm. L. REv.
831 (2008) (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Some ReaismAboutReaism-Respondingto Dean
Pound 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1243 (1931)).
22. Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Variedes ofNewLegalReaism: Can a New
World OrderPromptaNewLegalTheory., 95 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 125 (2009).
23. Id. at 123.
24. Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, A New Legal Empiicism? Assessing
ELSandAR, 6 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Scl. 555, 563 (2010).
25.
Seeid.at 564; see alsoNourse & Shaffer, supm note 22, at 119-21.
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demands for positive reenfranchising text at first look like a classic
self-protective bureaucratic move, not an issue of legal interpretation.
But considered as a search for documentary vehicles of reenfranchisement, county administrators' behavior suggests new ways to understand
federal judges' reluctance to disturb states' felony disenfranchisement
laws.
The original realists had doubts about the power of legal texts to
determine, doctrinally, legal decision making. In this Article, I explore
how legal documents might still play a part in legal decision making,
even if their meanings are indeterminate. Constitutional interpretation
and voter registration list maintenance are generally viewed as
disparate types of legal decision making, so that analysis of one is not
likely to shed light on the other. Nevertheless, the decisions of both
local election administrators and federal judges may be influenced by
the notion that putting something in writing ("documenting" it) not
only evidences legal status but reinforces that status and, in effect,
makes it more difficult to change. I am suggesting that written legal
texts do indeed constrain legal decision makers to some extent, but not
necessarily in ways that vindicate a doctrinal view of our legal system.
In the context of felony-voting bans, for both judges and election
administrators, positive legal text seems to have a kind of primacy that
is not reducible to either wholly evidentiary or constitutive power. Is
this just sloppy thinking, or is there some priority that legitimately
and/or necessarily attaches to written documentation in our
contemporary legal system? By exploring this phenomenon in federal
courts' treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment and election officials'
treatment of voter database codes, I aim to help us rethink both what is
so problematic and what is so attractive about ascribing to legal
documents the power to overcome their enactors' intentions.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part II, I lay out the
background of felony-voting bans, outlining states' formal disenfranchisement provisions, the different political effects of permanent and
temporary disenfranchisement, some federal court decisions upholding
these policies, and recent state legislative and executive reforms.
In Part III, I introduce the concept of documentary disenfranchisement-the practice of indefinitely extending temporary
disenfranchisement with demands for unobtainable eligibility
documents. Focusing on interviews with local New York election
officials in 2002-2005 and voting rights advocacy with St. Louis
county officials during the 2008 presidential election, I make the case
that disenfranchisement that is temporary on the books may be
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permanent in practice.
I then consider the implications of
documentary disenfranchisement. As a political matter, evidence of
documentary disenfranchisement suggests that felony-voting bans may
continue to depress African-American voting participation, despite
state legislative reforms. I then go on to consider how documentary
disenfranchisement both reflects and shapes the social meaning of
criminal conviction and our legal-cultural commitment to the power of
legal documents.
In Part IV,I show how local officials' approach to quotidian legal
documents may illuminate judges' constitutional interpretation. This
Part looks at federal court decisions turning back challenges to felony
disenfranchisement. If criminal voting bans produce significant racial
vote dilution, that could destabilize the Supreme Court precedent that
protects these bans-on the opinion's own original intent rationale.
Recent federal circuit court opinions dismissing vote dilution
challenges, however, have moved away from the Supreme Court's
original intent inquiry in this area. Instead, the courts of appeals have
adopted an extreme acontextual textualist approval of felony
disenfranchisement. In that analysis, a positive reference to criminal
disenfranchisement in an ancillary section of the Fourteenth
Amendment is held to insulate the practice from review under
legislation passed to enforce the Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection. The federal appellate courts' approach to vote dilution
challenges to felony disenfranchisement looks more like the local
election officials' documentary disenfranchisement than the Supreme
Court's constitutional interpretation.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE STANDARD PICTURE OF FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT

The new piece of empirical information this Article brings to the
table is evidence that felony-voting bans that are temporary on paper
are sometimes permanent in practice. In order to see the significance
of that information, it is necessary to understand the standard picture
of criminal disenfranchisement in the United States today, and the
ways in which that picture has recently changed.
By current estimates, some 5.3 million Americans are covered by
state legislative and constitutional bans on voting by individuals
convicted of crimes.26 Over two million of those known to be
26. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 1, at 76, 248-50, tbl.A3.3. This figure is the
estimate of the two leading social scientists in the field as of 2004. These are the numbers
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disqualified have completed serving their sentences; they are clustered
in the few states that still retain permanent disenfranchisement laws on
their books or that have only recently replaced permanent disenfranchisement with temporary voting bans.27 The effects of felony
disenfranchisement are not race neutral. Across the country, criminal
disenfranchisement laws disqualify about 8%of the African-American
voting-aged population. That is four times the rate for whites.28 The
four states with blanket permanent disenfranchisement laws still on the
books are estimated to disqualify much greater proportions of their
electorates-and fully 20% of their collective African-American
voting-age population.29 If permanent disenfranchisement were more
widespread, the total number of Americans disqualified from voting
would be far greater, as would the dilution of African-American voting
power.
Attempts to revisit the status of felony disenfranchisement in
court have foundered, largely due to the Supreme Court's holding that
such voting bans are presumptively constitutional.30 Most states,
however, have rewritten their laws to turn lifelong voting bans into
temporary disenfranchisement that lasts only for the duration of a
convicted person's sentence. Recently, there has been a flurry of such
liberalizing codification.
A.

States' CodifiedLawsand the Effects ofPennanent
Disenfianchisement

According to the laws states maintain on their books, criminal
convictions today rarely trigger permanent disenfranchisement. Since
the 1960s, many states have reformed their laws barring voting by
used by both advocates and courts. See also Felony DisenfranchisementLaws, supranote 7;
Voting Afer Cinnal Conviction, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JusT., http://www.brennancenter.
org/content/section/category/voting-afterscriminalconviction/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
As the social scientists who compiled these figures explain, the estimation of those criminally
disenfranchised is not a simple matter, because in addition to counting the numbers of
currently incarcerated individuals who are disenfranchised, one must estimate the population
of people who have completed their sentences but remain disenfranchised in the four states
that retain permanent bans on the books. That number, in turn, is affected by deaths and
recidivism. See MANZA & UGGEN, supm note 1, at 74-77.

27. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 1, 248-50, tbl.A3.3.
28. See id.at 78, fig.3-4.
29. Id. at 251-53, tbl.A.3.4 (adding together Manza & Uggen's estimates for each of
Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, and Virginia's African-American voting-age populations and
dividing the result by the combined number of African Americans disenfranchised in those
states by felony voting bans).
30. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974).
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people with criminal records." In just the last decade, seven states
have abandoned blanket permanent disenfranchisement in favor of
temporary voting bans.32 Only Florida, Kentucky, Iowa, and Virginia
currently have laws on the books that permanently disenfranchise
everyone convicted of a felony." In seven other states, laws make
disenfranchisement permanent for some or most types of offenses or
for multiple convictions.34 The vast majority of states, forty-six, have
codified laws that allow voting at some point after conviction for at
least some of those convicted." Two of those states, Maine and
Vermont, do not disenfranchise for criminal conviction." Thirteen
states and the District of Columbia prohibit voting only while a
convicted person is incarcerated." In the remaining thirty-one states,
conviction triggers a loss of voting rights not only in prison but also on
parole, and twenty-six of these also bar voting by probationers." Since
31. Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Ballot Manipulationand the
'Menace ofNegro Domination": RacialThreat andFelon Disenfranchisementin the United
States, 1850-2002, 109 AM. J.SOCIOLOGY 559, 564 (2003).
32. These states are Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
and Wyoming. See Felony DisenfmnchisementLaws, supra note 7.
33. See id.
34. Id. Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee permanently disenfranchise for some
offenses, while Nevada does so for all but first-time nonviolent offenses. In Arizona, a
second felony conviction makes disenfranchisement permanent, and in Delaware and
Wyoming people convicted of certain offenses are eligible for reenfranchisement five years
after completing their sentences. Most of these states have some form of completely
discretionary review that may result in reenfranchisement for a small number of people who
are able and willing to go through the process. For instance, in Alabama, people seeking
rights restoration beyond the regular administrative process must provide DNA samples.
Patricia Allard & Marc Mauer, Regaining the Vote: An Assessment ofActivity Relating to
Felon DisenfranchisementLaws, THE SENT'G PROJECT, 4 (2000), http://www.sentencing
project.org/doc/publications/fcdregainingthevote.pdf.
35. This includes the District of Columbia. Felony DisenfrdnchisementLaws, supra
note 7.
36. In Maine and Vermont, felony conviction does not affect voting rights at all. Id.
Prisoners vote. This is also the case in Puerto Rico, where candidates regularly campaign in
prison. Puerto Rico, THE SENT'G PROJECT (Sept. 17, 2005), http://www.sentencingproject.
Note that prisoners vote by
org/doc/File/Collateral%20Consequences/PuertoRico.pdf
absentee ballot in home districts. This raises the issue of census counts using prisoners who
do not vote as part of base population in voting districts where prisons are housed. See Peter
Wagner, Importig Constituents: Pnsones and Political Clout A New York PRiSON Pol'Y
(May 20,2002), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/importing/importing.html.
37. These states are Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Utah.
Felony DisenfranchisementLaws, supra note 7; Cnminal DisenfranchisementLaws Across
the United States, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/page//Democracy/USA%20MAP%203.23.20 11 .pdf [hereinafter Crminal Disenfranchisement
Laws].
38. Felony DisenfranchisementLaws; supra note 7. "Parole" is release into the
community under certain conditions following all or part of a prison term. "Probation" is an
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2000, seven states have repealed blanket permanent bans to allow
restoration of voting rights to at least some people with felony
convictions."
The shift from permanent to temporary disenfranchisement is
potentially significant for two reasons. First, for an individual, lifelong
exclusion from a central civic preoccupation is different than not being
able to vote while serving a limited criminal sentence. Most basically,
one confines disenfranchisement to a defined period of punishment
that has an endpoint; the other expresses and helps to constitute an
irrevocable change in political status that indefinitely separates a
person from the community.
Second, permanent disenfranchisement has much more potent
group effects than temporary voting bans. When people cannot regain
their rights at the end of their sentences, and new people are sentenced
every day, the numbers disqualified are cumulative and add up quickly.
The highest rates of disenfranchisement are, for the most part,
concentrated in the handful of states that either recently had, or still
maintain, permanent voting bans.40
For instance, compare the overall disenfranchisement rates
calculated according to the different laws codified in New York and
Florida. Under the New York Election Code, a felony conviction
triggers cancellation of voting rights only while a person is in prison
and on parole; a person sentenced to probation never loses her rights,
and rights are restored upon completion of parole.41 From a voting-age
population of nearly 14.7 million, New York law disqualifies about
122,000 (less than 1%).42 In Florida, however, where a blanket lifelong
ban is in force, the state disenfranchises over a million people, 9% of
its thirteen million potential voters.43 Combining the high levels of
overall disenfranchisement when a state employs a permanent voting
alternative to a sentence of incarceration to be served entirely in the community under set
terms of supervision.
39. These states are Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, and
Wyoming. Nicole D. Porter, Expanding the Vote: State Felony DisenfranchisementRefonn,
1997-2010, THE SENT'G PROJECT, 4-5, 12, 16-18, 20, 32 (Oct. 2010), http://www.sentencing
project.org/doc/publications/publications/vrExpandingtheVoteFinalAddendum.pdf. Two other
states, Florida and Iowa, rescinded permanent disenfranchisement during this period through
executive orders but subsequently (after elections) reinstated it. See sources cited supra note
9.
40. See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 7; Cinunal DisenfranchisementLaws, supranote 37.
41. N.Y ELEC. LAW § 5-106(2)-(15) (McKinney 2011).
42. MANzA & UGGEN, supra note 1, at 248-49, tbl.A3.3.
43. Id.at 248, tbl.A3.3.
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ban with the racial disparities in criminal enforcement in every state
potentially depletes African-American voting strength. In Florida,
nearly one in five (19%) African Americans of voting age are barred
from the polls."
Compare this to New York's temporary
disenfranchisement law, which, on paper, bars only 4% of black New
Yorkers from voting.45 As Part III of this Article describes, the reality
in New York may be much closer to Florida than those figures reveal.
But for the moment, these estimates suffice to show the very different
impact on African-American voting power of permanent and
temporary criminal disenfranchisement.
The deep and disparate racial impact of permanent disenfranchisement is visible in states that still codify such voting bans, or that
have only recently shifted to temporary disenfranchisement. Among
states that in 2004 still had permanent voting bans for at least some
individuals, the overall rate of disenfranchisement ranged from 2% to
9%.46 In all of these states, however, the African-American disenfranchisement rate was far higher, often by a factor of three or four. In
Kentucky it was 24%; it was 23% in Nebraska, 21% in Arizona, and
20% in Virginia, Delaware, and Wyoming.47 In Iowa, a stunning 34%
of the state's small African-American population is permanently barred
from voting.48
Permanent disenfranchisement's double whammy of deep and
racially disproportionate vote culling raises the issue of group
disenfranchisement, or vote "dilution."' Modem voting rights law
recognizes that voting rights are in some respects group rights.50
Individualized concepts like the right to participate in elections without
unnecessary burdens have been augmented with group claims to
protect collective voting power. As Judge Richard Posner put it, "The
44. Id. at 251, tbl.A3.4.
45. This is approximately 79,000 of 1.9 million voting-age black New Yorkers. Id at
252, tbl.A3.4.
46. Id.at 248-50, tbl.A3.3.
47. Id. at 251-53, tbl.A3.4.
48. Id. The overall felony disenfranchisement rate in Iowa is 5%, meaning that blacks
in Iowa are disenfranchised at more than six times the rate of whites. Id at 248, tbl.A3.3,
251, tbl.A3.4.
49. Temporary felony disenfranchisement, particularly voting bans limited to
incarceration, usually generate greater dispantdes in their racial effects, but because the
numbers are limited, they may ultimately have less salience for groups' practical electoral
power.
50. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) ("This Court has long
recognized that multimember districts and at-large voting schemes may operate to minimize
or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting population." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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benefits of voting to the individual voter are elusive (a vote in a
political election rarely has any instrumentalvalue, since elections for
political office at the state or federal level are never decided by just one
vote).""
Vote dilution became a paradigmatic voting rights claim in the
late twentieth century. For instance, much of the litigation about
legislative districting involved claims that districting schemes
impermissibly "diluted" the power of minority groups to elect
candidates of choice.5 2 The concept of dilution applies with equal
force to felony disenfranchisement. Voting bans based on criminal
conviction thin the ranks of qualified potential voters in minority
neighborhoods where criminal law enforcement efforts are
concentrated while leaving the electorate in white neighborhoods
relatively intact. As Pam Karlan explains, "Criminal disenfranchisement laws ... operate as a kind of collective sanction: They penalize
not only actual wrongdoers, but also the communities from which
incarcerated prisoners come and the communities to which exoffenders return by reducing their relative political clout."' In some
urban neighborhoods with high concentrations of criminal convictions,
electoral participation by residents is seriously depleted under felony
disenfranchisement regimes, especially when voting bans are
permanent.54

51.
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 E3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007), affm
553 U.S. 181 (2008).
52. Vote dilution was first defined as a harm and challenged in a series of
constitutional attacks. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); see also Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). When in City ofMobile v Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), the
Supreme Court imposed an intent requirement on dilution claims under equal protection,
Congress stepped in by amending the Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)), to provide a legislative remedy for racial vote dilution
based on effects.
After the 1982 Amendments, Section 2 of the VRA became the primary vehicle for
claims of vote dilution. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H.
PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 595-96
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d. ed. 2007); Ellen Katz et al., DocumenthigDiscniminationin
Voting: JudicialFindmgs UnderSection 2 ofthe Voting RightsAct Since 1982, 39 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 643, 650 (2006). A seminal Supreme Court decision of a vote dilution claim
under Section 2 of the VRA is Thornbug. 478 U.S. 30.
53. Karlan, supra note 2, at 1161.
54.
See Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jan Holland, Neghborhoo4 Cnime, and
Incarcemtion i New York City,36 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 71, 100 (2004). One study of
Tallahassee, Florida, found that in two neighborhoods, more than 1.5% of residents entered
prison in one year TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: How MASS INCARCERATION
MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 66 (2007).
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When large numbers of residents are disenfranchised due to
criminal convictions, their law-abiding neighbors lose political power
as well. The voice of the neighborhood is weakened both directly,
because it has collectively fewer votes, and indirectly because elected
officials and candidates for office can afford to ignore the concerns of
a neighborhood that has few votes to back it up. Within cities, rates of
criminal conviction-and hence of disenfranchisement-vary greatly
from one neighborhood to another. In New York City, one finds areas
where the annual rate of imprisonment is sixty times that of other
neighborhoods." In some parts of Brooklyn, one of every three
neighborhood youths aged sixteen to twenty-four is sent to prison or
jail everyyear." Of course people also come home from prison. But if
voting bans outlast incarceration, the numbers of the disenfranchised
in such a neighborhood continue to increase.
Racial disparities in disenfranchisement play out in local voting
power. For instance, a study in Georgia found that African-American
men are disenfranchised statewide at a rate of about 12.6%, more than
six times the 2% rate for other men." This already strong racial
disparity intensified on the local level. In some Atlanta neighborhoods
(defined by zip code), black men's disenfranchisement rates were far
higher-21% in one neighborhood and 27% in another." Within
neighborhoods, the ratio between black and white male disenfranchisement was generally much higher than the state average. Nine of
Atlanta's twenty neighborhoods had ratios over ten." In other words,
in nearly half the neighborhoods in Atlanta, black men were more than
ten times as likely as other men to be barred from voting.
Such disparities are of course driven by racial differences in
criminal conviction and incarceration rates. Though the reasons for
racial differences in criminal justice outcomes are complex and
contested, it is important to recognize that empirical evidence belies
the notion that they simply reflect racial differences in criminal
behavior. One area where this is particularly clear is drug crimes,
which have played a central role over the last twenty to thirty years in
55. CLEAR, supra note 54, at 65.
56. Todd R. Clear, The Effects of High Imprisonment Rates on Communities, 37
CRIME & JUST. 97, 103 (2008). This grim statistic brings to mind a scene of legal winnowing
in a decidedly different context. Recall the exhortation of the sadistic Professor Kingsfield to
a new IL class at Harvard: "Look to your left, look to your right . . . ." THE PAPER CHASE
(Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1973).
57. King & Mauer, supranote 2, at 5, tbl.1.
58. Id.at 10.
59. Id.at 11.
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Americans' higher rates of conviction, incarceration, and disenfranThe best data available on drug use, national selfchisement.'
reporting surveys, indicates that white Americans use illicit drugs at a
somewhat higher rate than do blacks." Moreover, several sources
suggest that blacks and whites are involved in drug trafficking at
similar rates.62 Nevertheless, blacks are arrested and convicted of drug
crimes at much higher rates than whites-disparities that grew
dramatically during the "war on crime" years. For instance, in 2003,
black drug arrest rates were 3.5 times the rate for whites." Policy
choices that focus enforcement on the urban-street drug trade rather
than on drug sales in the suburbs and on college campuses certainly
contribute to these disparities. Whether one regards such policies as
legitimate responses to the differential social effects (and greater
accessibility) of street crime or as racially biased targeting of minority
communities, it is clear that they result in racial disparities in
disenfranchisement that do not reflect racial differences in criminality.
Permanent felony disenfranchisement thus has the potential to
reflect and amplify racial disparities in criminal justice that are
artifacts of policy-not reflections of criminal behavior. Moreover,
racially skewed criminal disenfranchisement burdens both individual
rights and group political power. It forbids individuals once convicted
from rejoining a central political ritual of the communities where they
reside. It flatly denies convicted individuals' right to vote. And it
makes it harder for communities already depleted by the war on crime
to elect and hold accountable political representatives, and to be heard
regarding the very criminal justice policies that cause the
disenfranchisement in the first place.

60. The proportion of convicts incarcerated for drug crimes has increased from about
17% in 1988 to 32% in 2002. MANZA & UGGEN, supranote 1, at 101.
61.
Office of Applied Statistics, 2007 National Survey on Drug Use & Health.
Detailed Tables, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, tbl.1.19B, http://www.oas.

samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k7NSDUH/tabs/SectlpeTabslto46.htm#Tabl.19B (last updated Dec.
30, 2008) (noting that in 2007, the reported rate for ever having used illegal drugs was 50.3%
for whites, compared with 43.1% for blacks).
62.

See, e g., MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA

61-67 (2011).
63. Id. at 67-68; see also Farakhan Il, 590 E3d 989 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth
Circuit describes evidence presented by criminologists, including "studies showing, interalia,
that the racial disparities in [Washington] state's criminal justice system cannot be explained
by 'legitimate' factors, such as racial minorities' higher level of involvement in criminal
activity," and notes studies that show that 20% to "substantially more than half" of blacks'
higher rates of imprisonment cannot be explained by higher levels of criminal involvement.
Id at 994-95 & n.5.
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B. FederalCourts'Responsesto FelonyDisenfhanchisement
Under the Supreme Court's standard analysis of voting rights
restrictions, felony disenfranchisement looks constitutionally suspect.
One line of cases treats any voting qualification as a burden on a
"fundamental right" and thus subjects it to strict scrutiny;" another
uses a sliding scale, ratcheting up the intrusiveness of the Court's
review depending on the weight of the burden the state law imposes on
voting rights." Under either doctrinal test, it looks like felony
disenfranchisement-at least permanent felony disenfranchisementwould present the heaviest of burdens (that is, outright cancellation of
voting rights for life and deep dilution of group voting power) and thus
would face the most intrusive federal review.6 So, how do states
justify as "compelling" an interest in prohibiting voting long past the
end of the criminal sentence?
The answer is: they do not have to.
1.

Richardson v Ramirez

Richardson v Ramrez, a long-standing Supreme Court
precedent, protects felony disenfranchisement from a straightforward
constitutional challenge under modem voting rights theory." In
Richardson, decided in 1974, the Court held that, unlike other voting
qualifications, permanent criminal disenfranchisement is presumptively legitimate." Richardson was a challenge to California's then
permanent voting ban for anyone convicted of an "infamous crime.""
Relying on the Supreme Court's now classic voting rights cases, the
California court held that the state had no "compelling interest" in
disenfranchising its criminally convicted citizens once they had
finished serving their sentences and invalidated the policy under the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.o
64. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,670 (1966).
65. Burdick v.Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,434-35 (1992). Arguably, the Court
harmonized these two divergent approaches in favor of a sliding scale in Crawfordv Marion
County. 553 U.S. 181 (2008). Compareid.at 189-91 (majority opinion), with id at 209-12
(Souter, J., dissenting).
66. The Court has never clarified whether the burden on voting is to be understood in
terms of the effect of the challenged policy on the average voter or on the numbers or
percentage of voters affected. See Justin Levitt, Long Lines at the Courthouse: Pre-Election
Litigation ofElectionDayBurdens,9 ELEcTION L.J. 19, 32-33 (20 10).
67. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
68. Id.at 54-56.
69. Id at 26-27.
70. Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P2d 1345, 1353 (Cal. 1973), vysubnom. Richardson,
418 U.S. 24.
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The Supreme Court reversed." According to Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion, the reason felony disenfranchisement escaped the
equal protection hammer that struck down other state voting
qualifications is the Reduction in Representation Clause in Section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 This relatively obscure portion of the
Amendment provides that if a state bars voting by "any of the male
inhabitants ... being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the

United States," that state's representation in Congress will be reduced
in proportion to the percentage of its male population barred from the
polls "except for participation in rebellion, or other crame"' The
Richardsonmajority reasoned that the reference to "crime" generally
exempted criminal disenfranchisement from the penalty of reduced
representation, and that such an exception in Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment also insulated criminal disenfranchisement
from challenges under the Equal Protection Clause in Section 1 of the
Amendment. 4 The Court adopted the petitioner's argument that "those
who framed and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment could not have
intended to prohibit outright in § 1 of that Amendment that which was
expressly exempted from the lesser sanction of reduced representation
imposed by § 2 of the Amendment." 5
2.

Vote Dilution Challenges Under the Federal Voting Rights Act

Richardsonwas decided in 1974, before the war on crime made
felony disenfranchisement laws as potent as they are today. But
because the overall rates of criminal conviction and corresponding
total numbers of disenfranchisement were low, the racial vote dilution
potential of felony disenfranchisement was much lower. Indeed,
though the issue was raised in an amicus brief, the disenfranchised
Richardson,418 U.S. at 56.
72. See id. at 54-56.
73. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 2 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The full text
of the Reduction in Representation Clause reads:
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President
and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participationm rebellion, orothercrnme,the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
74. See Richardson,418 U.S. at 55.
75.
Id.at 43.

71.
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plaintiffs in Richardson brought no race-based claims. Nevertheless,
in a series of recent cases, Richardson's protection of felony
disenfranchisement has been treated as immune to changing social
conditions, because of its reliance on the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Recently, the idea that state felony disenfranchisement laws enjoy
unique textual protection in the Fourteenth Amendment has grown,
solidified, and been used repeatedly to turn back federal court
challenges, including a number of claims brought under the VRA for
racial vote dilution." In 1974 when Richadson was decided, felonyvoting bans disenfranchised only about 1% of the voting-age
population nationwide." Since then, however, the war on crime has
swelled the numbers of Americans potentially subject to this "collateral
With more and more
consequence" of criminal conviction."
provisions
disenfranchisement
felony
permanent
convicted,
Americans
took bigger and bigger bites out of the voting public. And because in
every state African Americans are convicted in numbers
disproportionate to their presence in the population, criminal voting
bans disproportionately disqualify them from voting. Under these
conditions, a once-marginal form of voting qualification can now
make a significant, racially skewed dent in a state's electorate. Among
black men, the numbers are quite stunning. It has been estimated that
76. See frrakhanIV 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010); Hayden III, 594 E3d 150 (2d Cir.
2010); Simrmons11, 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009); Johnson 1, 405 E3d 1214 (11 th Cir. 2005).
77. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 1, at 223, fig. 10.1. The racial skew in criminal
convictions, and thus in criminal disenfranchisement, predates the war on crime, and thus
existed at the time Richardson was decided. The racial disparity has grown over time,
however, along with the absolute numbers ofAmericans with felony convictions. Christopher
Uggen, Jeff Manza & Melissa Thompson, Citizenship, Democracy and the Civic
Reintegmtion of Cninbal Offenders, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 281, 292,
fig.5 (2006).
78. Jurisprudence of criminal punishment distinguishes between punitive "direct
effects" and "collateral consequences" of criminal sentences. The latter are not subject to
Eighth Amendment review. Generally, felony disenfranchisement is viewed as a
paradigmatic collateral consequence, imposed for a regulatory rather than punitive purpose.
A famous piece of Supreme Court dicta explains that a person convicted of bank robbery
loses his right to liberty and often his right to vote. If, in the exercise of the power
to protect banks, both sanctions were imposed for the purpose of punishing bank
robbers, the statutes authorizing both disabilities would be penal. But because the
purpose of the latter statute is to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for
voting, this law is sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the
franchise.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). But cf
Karlan, supm note 2, at 1149-50 (arguing that felony disenfranchisement is "essentially
punitive" and thus open to an Eighth Amendment challenge).
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one in seven African-American men have lost the right to vote," thus a
significant number of African-American men were unable to vote in
the 2008 election that made an African-American man president. To
voting rights advocates, numbers like those suggest an actionable
claim of vote dilution under the VRA.o
In the last five years, however, three federal courts of appealsthe United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, and Eleventh
Circuits-have all held that the VRA's prohibition on voting
qualifications that results in a dilution of a racial group's voting power
does not apply to state felony disenfranchisement laws." Although the
courts' opinions are couched in terms of interpreting the intended
scope of the VRA, each ultimately relies on the view that felony
disenfranchisement enjoys a special status among voting qualifications, created by its unique textual presence in the Fourteenth
Amendment.82 In a fourth case, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, instead of holding expressly that criminal
disenfranchisement is categorically outside the VRA, imposed a
unique evidentiary requirement that makes criminal voting bans
effectively unreachable." The current unanimity masks significant
79. MANZA&UGGEN, supra note l,at 80.
80. The limits and extent of Richardson's constitutional protection for felony
disenfranchisement are, of course, still a matter of interpretation. Richardson itself made
clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's "affirmative sanction" of criminal voting bans is not a
constitutional blank check. 418 U.S. at 54. After holding that states' felony disenfranchisement laws were not subject to the typical "fundamental voting rights" inquiry under equal
protection, the Court remanded the case to see whether California's unequal application of its
criminal voting ban might violate equal protection. Id. at 56. Then, in 1985 in Hunter v
Underwood the Court held that excepting felony disenfranchisement laws from the
Reduction in Representation Clause does not protect voting bans passed deliberately to
disenfranchise African Americans. 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985). As the Court explained (in
another opinion written by Justice Rehnquist), "[W]e are confident that § 2 was not designed
to permit the purposeful racial discrimination attending the enactment and operation of
[Alabama's permanent disenfranchisement law] which otherwise violates § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in our opinion in Richardson v Ramirez suggests the
contrary." Id (citation omitted).
81.
See FarrakhanIV 623 E3d 990; Hayden II, 594 E3d 150; SinrnonsIf 575 F3d
24; Johnson lI, 405 E3d 1214.
82. In each case, the opinions come from courts that divide, to some extent, along
predictable political lines-but not entirely. Indeed, the two en banc opinions from the
Eleventh and Second Circuits were written by judges appointed by Democrats and generally
considered to be among the moderate, if not liberal, judges on their respective benches. See
Hayden v. Pataki (Hayden Hl), 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc); Johnson H, 405 F.3d
1214.
83. Rarrakhan IV 623 E3d at 993 (holding that plaintiffs challenging criminal
disenfranchisement under the VRA must "show that the criminal justice system is infected by
intentionaldiscrimination or that the felon disenfranchisement law was enacted with such
intent"). The requirement to prove intentional discrimination directly contradicts the Act's
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differences in federal judges' approaches to felony disenfranchisement.
There were dissenters in every one of the four circuits that produced
these precedents.' Nevertheless, after the most recent round of federal
court losses, felony disenfranchisement appears doctrinally
untouchable-mainly because of its unique appearance in the text of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
C

State Legislativeand ExecutiveReform ofFelony
Disenfranchisement

While federal litigation against felony disenfranchisement has
been unsuccessful, recent efforts to reform felony disenfranchisement
laws have produced a spate of state legislative and executive action.
Since 2000, seven states have changed the laws on their books from
lifelong voting bans for all those convicted of felonies to some form of
temporary disenfranchisement for at least some of those convicted. In
Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, and
Wyoming, state legislatures approved bills that reenfranchise some or
all of those convicted of felonies at some point after completion of
their sentences." During that same period, two other states, Florida
and Iowa, used executive orders to provide for reenfranchisement upon
completion of sentence, but subsequently reverted to blanket
permanent voting bans."
assignment of liability for any voting qualification that "results in a denial or abridgement of
the right ... to vote on account of race." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the "results" language was added to the Act in 1982 specifically to allow statutory
challenges to voting rights qualifications without the proof of intentional racial bias that the
Court had deemed necessary for challenges under the Fifteenth Amendment. At least one
member of the Farrakhanen banc court apparently understands the majority opinion to hold
criminal disenfranchisement laws outside the VRA's reach. Concurring in the judgment,
Judge Graber explains that because the court could have affirmed the district judge's
conclusion that the challenged law survived VRA scrutiny, there is "no need to reach the
question whether felon disenfranchisement laws may be challenged under Section 2 of the
VRA." FarakhanIV 623 E3d at 997 (Graber, J., concurring).
84. See cases cited supra note 81. Though ultimately the Ninth Circuit opinion in
Fanakhanproduced no dissents, an earlier panel opinion allowing the case to move forward
without proof of intentional discrimination was denied en banc review. Farrakhan v.
Washington (FaRnkhan II), 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004). A previous case before the
Second Circuit resulted in an evenly split en banc decision. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F3d 919 (2d
Cir. 1996).
85. FelonyDisenfanchisementLaws,supm note 7; Porter, supra note 39.
86. Porter, supm note 39, at 9-10, 12. In 2005, the governor of Iowa issued an
executive order that restored the voting rights of all ex-offenders upon completion of
sentence, but this order was reversed in 2011 by a subsequent governor. In 2007, the newly
elected governor of Florida, Charlie Crist, along with the other members of the Florida
Clemency Board, approved a restoration procedure to reinstate the voting rights for about half
of those convicted of felonies, but this was later reversed. See sources cited supra note 9.
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The last decade of reform is really a second wave. In the 1960s
and 1970s there were campaigns in many states to shift from
permanent to temporary disenfranchisement. That earlier reform had
already made some headway when Richardson was decided in 1974."
In the years that followed, the trend intensified. In 1974, as the
Richardsondissent noted, about half the states (twenty-seven) had laws
on the books that reinstated voting rights for at least some of those
convicted of felonies at the end of a criminal sentence. Today that
number is forty-four." The shift from permanent to temporary voting
bans ostensibly reduces significantly the numbers of Americans
disenfranchised by criminal convictions. Social scientists Jeff Manza
and Christopher Uggen estimate that if the disenfranchisement laws of
1960 were frozen in place, the numbers locked out of the polls today
would rise to over ten million, or nearly 5% of the country's current
electorate."
87. In fact, in the 1970s, for a period of several years, Florida adopted temporary
disenfranchisement. After a federal court upheld Florida's permanent disenfranchisement law
against an equal protection challenge, Beacham v. Braterman, 300 E Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla.
1969), the legislature passed a statute mandating automatic restoration upon completion of
sentence. The Florida Supreme Court subsequently held, in an advisory opinion, that it
violated the state constitution. InreAdvisory Op. of Governor Civil Rights, 306 So. 2d 520,
523-24 (Fla. 1975). New York's temporary disenfranchisement statute was likewise passed
after the state's permanent disenfranchisement law was upheld by a federal court. See
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 85 n.28 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Green v.
Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967)). Green v BoardofElections is an opinion by
Judge Henry Friendly that is often cited for its articulation of the "subversive voting"
rationale for felony disenfranchisement, that is, the idea that felony disenfranchisement is
justified as a way to prevent criminals from banding together and attempting to wreck the
criminal justice system by voting as a bloc for legislators and prosecutors who will
undermine the rule of law. See, e.g., Alec C. Ewald, An "Agenda for Demolition": The
Fallacyandthe Dangerof the "Subversive Voting"Argument for Felony Disenfrdnchisement,
36 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 109, 117-18 (2004). Most academic commentators agree that
disenfranchisement to prevent individuals, or for that matter groups, from voting their
interests-however subversive-would be considered unconstitutional today in any context
other than felony disenfranchisement. See Karlan, supra note 2, at 1152. Indeed, under
modern voting rights theory, disenfranchisement to prevent subversive voting may actually be
a form of invidious discrimination sufficient to overcome the presumption of constitutionality
Richardsonprovides. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) ('Fencing out' from
the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally
impermissible."). Nevertheless, in 2009, the First Circuit blandly reiterated this rationale in
its decision rejecting a VRA challenge to Massachusetts' ban on prisoners voting, explaining
that "the Commonwealth enacted this prohibition after prisoners attempted to organize to
change the laws under which they were convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned." Sinmons JI,
575 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2009).
88. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 7. Four states, Florida, Iowa,
Kentucky, and Virginia, permanently disenfranchise convicted felons, and two states, Maine
and Vermont, do not disenfranchise at all.
89. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 1, at 222.
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So, two opposing trends shape the effects of felony disenfranchisement today. The greatly increased rate of convictions and
incarceration under states' war on crime policies in the late twentieth
century geometrically increased the proportion of states' electorates
excluded by these policies. But during that same period, many states
shifted from regimes that disenfranchised convicts for life to
temporary voting bans that are intended to expire at the end of a
convicted person's sentence. Although the increased rate of conviction
still significantly increased the total numbers and proportions
disenfranchised, the shift to temporary voting bans mitigated that
trend. At least, that is the story on paper.
III. DOCUMENTARY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: WHAT IF
TEMPORARY BANS BECOME PERMANENT?

As things stand, then, permanent felony disenfranchisement has
the potential to dilute voting power significantly, but the vast majority
of states have codified some form of temporary disenfranchisement."
In most jurisdictions, people convicted of felonies lose their voting
rights when they go to prison and while on probation and parole, and
then they regain the right to vote when they complete their sentences.
These are the laws on the books. Interviews with local election
officials in New York, however, along with additional observations in
some other jurisdictions, suggest that in practice, permanent disenfranchisement sometimes persists despite codified reform."
I begin this Part with some empirical evidence that New York's
law of felony disenfranchisement may be quite different in its practical
administration than it is on paper. But the discussion in this and the
following Part is not empirical analysis in the traditional sense. Nor is
it the kind of straightforward comparison of "law in action" to "law on
the books" associated with the Law and Society Movement. Instead I
will argue that the local practices reported are significant on a number
of different levels. Rather than choosing a single analytic modeempirical description, doctrinal reasoning, policy prescription, or
theoretical critique, my goal in this discussion is to reflect multiple
90. These temporary voting bans also vary from state to state. Some states
disenfranchise only those who are currently incarcerated. At the other end of the spectrum, a
few states still permanently disenfranchise for some crimes and impose waiting periods after
sentence completion before others become eligible for rights restoration. In the middle are
thirty states where people convicted of felonies lose their voting rights for the duration of
incarceration and during at least some forms of community supervision.
Felony
DisenfranchisementLaws,supm note 7.
91.
See infm Part III.B-C.
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interactive relationships between different actors in the legal system,
broad cultural norms and expectations, legal doctrines, and legalinterpretive practices. By considering what nitty-gritty election
administration may reveal about constitutional theory on the one hand,
and popular notions of legal text's transformative mechanisms on the
other, I aim to explore "relationships between law, experience, and
culture." 92
The analysis begins with observations of concrete local practices.
Then I trace what I take to be reciprocal connections among those
practices, legal rules and doctrines, broad cultural understandings and
aspirations about law's powers and methods, and expert modes of legal
interpretation. The idea is to come down out of the clouds of doctrinal
and theoretical-political analysis and look to see how local
administration of felony disenfranchisement laws may illuminate both
those laws' meaning and legal interpretation in other contexts.
A.

An New York:
Turnhng TemporaryDisenfranchisementPermanent
A Case Study

1.

The Law on the Books
In New York State, the election code provides that "[n]o person

who has been convicted of a felony ... shall have the right to register
for or vote at any election unless he shall have been pardoned . .. or his

maximum sentence of imprisonment has expired, or he has been
discharged from parole."" The voting ban does not apply, however, to
those not sentenced to "imprisonment, or if the execution of a sentence
of imprisonment is suspended."94 So, a New Yorker convicted of a
felony and sentenced only to probation-that is, to supervision in the
community without any period of incarceration-never loses his or her
voting rights." Those who serve time in prison and are then paroled to
community supervision, however, are not eligible to vote until they
have finished their period of parole. Thus, some New Yorkers who are
currently serving sentences in the community for felony convictions
are eligible to vote (probationers) and others (those on parole) are not.
Generally, a person is entitled to vote in New York upon
submission of a voter registration form including the required signed
92. Arthur E McEvoy, A New Realism for Legal Studies, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 433,
434. This multifarious method gives my analysis an affimity with scholarship that has been
dubbed "New Legal Realism," as does my "bottom up" approach.
93. N.Y ELEC. LAw § 5-106(2) (McKinney 2011).
94. Id. § 5-106(5).
95. Seeid
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affidavit, if the information in the form shows that the applicant is
legally qualified to vote.' In practice, New York voters typically do
not have to submit any additional proof that the information on their
registration forms is correct or that they are eligible to vote. New York
election codes and regulations do not provide any specific registration
procedures for persons with felony convictions who have completed
their sentences. The registration form includes an affidavit for the
voter to sign which includes the statement, "I meet all requirements to
register to vote in New York State." Although the affidavit itself
contains no separate statement regarding felony convictions, the
instruction sheet attached to the form informs the voter: "To register
you must ... not be in prison or on parole for a felony conviction.""
The Board of Elections may cancel a voter's registration for a
number of reasons, including incarceration for felony conviction,
moving out of the election district, adjudication as an incompetent,
refusal to take a challenge oath, death, or failing to vote in an election
after being placed on inactive status." If a registrant's name "appears
on the list of cancelled registrations, the inspectors of election shall
ascertain from such list the reason for cancellation, and if satisfied that
the reason for cancellation no longer exists shall register the
applicant."" County officials can identify individuals who are seeking
to reregister after a conviction by a computer code in the records
indicating the reason why their former registration status was
suspended. Typically, when a voter has his or her registration cancelled
for any reason other than a felony conviction (for example, because he
or she moved or had not voted in prior elections) county officials do
not require any additional documentary proof before allowing that
person to reregister. County boards accept the same voter registration
form and affidavit used for first-time registrants.
96. See id. § 5-210(5). The law also mandates, however, that "[i]f the county board
of elections suspects or believes that for any reason the applicant is not entitled to registration
and enrollment, it shall make inquiry in reference thereto." Id. § 5-210(10). An unqualified
applicant "shall be rejected and the applicant notified of such rejection and the reason
therefor." Id.
97. New York State Voter Regismation Form, N.Y STATE ELECTION BD. (Jan. 2011),
http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/download/voting/voteform.pdf.
98. Id The form itself includes check boxes for age, citizenship, and address. The
affidavit includes statements of citizenship and thirty day residency (but not age or felony
status) and states, "I understand that if it is not true, I can be convicted and fined up to $5,000
and/or jailed for up to four years." N.Y. ELEC. LAw § 5-210(5)(k)(xi).
99. Id § 5-400.
100. Id § 5-204(3)(d). Note that the list includes both changes in status (death,
conviction, incompetence, relocation) and evidence of such changes (refusal to take an oath
and failing to vote after a period of inactivity).
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The First New York Interviews-2002-2003

In 2002-2003, law students under my supervision phoned all
sixty-two county election boards in New York and inquired what a
person with a felony conviction who had fully served his sentence
needed to do in order to register to vote, or to reregister."' The results
were startling. In almost half the counties in New York, including all
five boroughs of New York City, officials demanded documentary
proof that the person seeking to register after a felony conviction had
completed his sentence." 2 New York election statutes impose no such
requirement that previously disenfranchised voters document their
eligibility. Not only that, in many cases the documents county boards
requested were entirely fictional. Some boards asked registrants to
provide a "Certificate of Release." There is no such document in New
York. Others, including all five New York City Boards, asked for a
"Certificate of Relief." This document, although real, is very rarely
provided. It is issued upon application to individuals still on parole or
after a sentence is complete as a matter of pure discretion.' 3
Furthermore, as codified in the New York statute that prescribes its
use, a Certificate of Relief is unavailable to anyone convicted of more
than one felony.'" Yet another document that relieves the disabilities of
criminal conviction, a "Certificate of Good Conduct," is available to
individuals convicted of more than one felony after a waiting period of
up to five years.' This even rarer document requires an investigation
to determine whether an "applicant has conducted himself or herself in
a manner warranting such issuance" before it can be granted.'' In
101. Survey documents are on file at the Brennan Center for Justice and with the
author.
102. Id. Some officials also expressed confusion about voting eligibility on probation
or simply stated incorrectly that people on probation in New York were not eligible to vote.
103. N.Y. CoRREcr. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2011). "A certificate of relief from
disabilities may be granted as provided in this article to relieve an eligible offender of any
forfeiture or disability .... " Id. § 701(1). The state department of corrections and
supervision may issue a certificate of relief when "consistent with the rehabilitation of the
eligible offender," and "consistent with the public interest." Id. § 703(3)(b)-(c). The
department may conduct an investigation to determine whether to grant the certificate. Id
§ 703(6). "In granting or revoking a certificate of relief from disabilities the action of the
department shall be deemed a judicial function and shall not be reviewable if done according
to law." Id. § 703(5).
104. Id.§ 701. An "eligible offender" is defined as "a person who has been convicted
of a crime or of an offense, but who has not been convicted more than once of a felony." Id.
§ 700(1)(a).
105. Id §703-b.
106. See id § 703-b(1)(a), (3). One commentator reports, based on a 2011 interview
with the New York Director of Executive Clemency, that the combined number of Certificates
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sum, by requiring ex-offenders to produce documents they could not
obtain readily, or at all, the county boards were effectively enforcing
temporary disenfranchisement laws as permanent voting bans."o' This
is the practice I call documentary disenfranchisement.
The practices of the city boards are particularly important when
considering the political impact of the documentary hurdle. Indeed it
is likely that the majority of New York State residents disenfranchised
by criminal convictions come from New York City, as evidenced by the
fact that fifty-six percent of people on parole in New York State live in
New York City.'" Thus New York City electoral practices affect a
correspondingly large proportion of New Yorkers with felony records.
If the city boards obstruct registration for lack of documentation, that
affects a significant number of potential voters. The city boards'
documentary disenfranchisement practices were further confirmed
when clients of an organization that helps people reenter society from
prison had their voter registration forms returned, along with letters
explaining that they could not reregister without proof of their renewed
eligibility.'"
When confronted with the interviews' findings, the New York
State Board of Elections did not contest them. In October 2003, we
sent a letter to the State Board, detailing the results of the interviews
and pointing out that county boards' demands for nonexistent
of Relief and Certificates of Good Conduct issued in 2010 by the Parole Board was 1621.
Joy Radice, AdrnhistengJustice: Removing StatutoryBarnems to Reentry, 83 U. COLO. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 48-49 tbl.1), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyuplltwp/294/. According to Radice, this number reflects a substantial uptick as the result of the
parole board's decision in 2005 to incorporate issuing certificates of relief into the parole
hearing process. Id. ("The Parole Board, in stating that an inmate was ready for parole, ready
to return to his community early, felt that a finding would be consistent with finding a person
eligible for a certificate which would enable that reintegration."). Thus it appears that a large
share of those 1621 certificates went to individuals currently on parole. Recall that under
New York election law, individuals on parole are generally ineligible to vote. N.Y. ELEC. LAW
§ 5-106(2) (McKinney 2011). Note then, that if the administrative policies Radice reports are
still in effect, the Election Boards' request for a Certificate of Relief would have the
paradoxical effect of enfranchising individuals who, under New York statutes, are ineligible to
vote without individualized relief, through a semiautomatic process initiated by the parole
board, while individuals who have finished serving their sentences altogether would need to
initiate individual applications for review.
107. Other county boards asked for other kinds of paper proof-letters from the court
or a parole officer, a "receipt of satisfaction" or "notice of release" from a probation officer.
Some of these also were apparently fictional and others apparently refer to papers received by
some people upon release from parole. Shalom & Randolph, supra note 13, at 2, 4; see supm
notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
108.

ParoleeFacts,N.Y ST. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS & COMMuNITY SUPERVISION (Mar.

2009), https://www.parole.state.ny.us/program-stats.html.
109. Letters are on file with Legal Action Center and the author.
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documentation were contrary to the intention of the state legislation to
allow people who had been disenfranchised by their criminal
convictions to reregister after serving their time."' The State Board
responded by issuing a memo to all county commissioners directing
them to change their practices."' The State Board declared that
"everyone who presents themselves to register, completes the
[registration] form and signs the affidavit, is presumed to be eligible
and should be registered."" 2 Moreover, the State Board explicitly
affirmed that "[a] person previously canceled for a felony conviction is
entitled to the same presumption of eligibility" as any other
registrant."3
3.

The Second New York Survey-2005

You might have expected that would be the end of it. If the
problem were simply one of confusion, you would think the State
Board's policy letter would have cleared up the matter at once. The
county election boards had no apparent partisan motivation for
keeping people with felony convictions away from the polls. To the
extent reenfranchising people with criminal convictions has a partisan
effect, it is thought to bolster Democratic vote counts." The New York
City Election Board is composed of equal numbers of Democratic and
Republican appointees, with no clear incentive or ability to
disadvantage systematically voters perceived to be likely to vote in any
110. The letter was a joint undertaking of attorneys representing the Brennan Center,
Legal Action Center, and Community Service Society. In addition, the groups brokered a
meeting between the state elections board and several criminal justice agencies to share
information and resources in order to make it easier to determine whether voter registration
applicants with convictions were eligible to vote. E-mail from Erika Wood, Formerly of the
Brennan Ctr., to author (July 1, 2011, 2:53 PM EST) (on file with author).
111. Memorandum from N.Y. State Bd. of Elections to Cnty. Comm'rs (Oct. 29, 2003)
[hereinafter Memo to Cnty. Comm'rs], available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/Id/downloadfile_9764.pdf.
112. Id.
113. Id. Acknowledging that county commissioners had been asking people with
felony convictions for "documentation that they cannot provide," the State Board directed the
commissioners to instead check an individual's sentencing status on a Department of
Correctional Services Web site in the event that there was reason to question his eligibility.
Phone numbers at Parole Services were provided in case there were questions about the Web
site. Finally, the letter explicitly cautioned that ex-offenders' sentencing status was to be
checked "only in those rare occasions when there is a question about a person's eligibility to
register and vote." Id The trigger for such an investigation "must be something more than
just the fact of the previous cancellation," because, like all other registrants, people with
convictions who complete voter registration forms and sign the affidavit affirming the truth
of their statements are "presumed eligible to register and vote." Id
114. MANZA & UGGEN, supmnote 1, at 188-91.
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predictable partisan pattern."' But the State Board's memo did not put
a stop to documentary disenfranchisement.
Three years later, my colleagues at the Brennan Center did a
series of follow-up interviews to see whether county election practices
had changed."' There had been some improvement. Nevertheless,
given the State Board's previous directive, there was still a surprising
incidence of documentary disenfranchisement. In the original 20022003 interviews, more than half of the county boards had reported
requiring some form of eligibility documentation before allowing
people with felony convictions to vote; in 2006, more than a third of
the boards continued to require documentation."' The forms of
documentation requested were remarkably varied, including a letter
from a judge or parole officer and an array of fictional papers-the old
"Certificate of Release," "a document of relief" from a judge, a
"release form" showing that a "person has paid his dues," and "a
pardon from the court." Four boards were asking for the existing, but
largely inapplicable "Certificate of Relief.""'
Three of five New York City boards were still demanding some
form of, largely unobtainable, documentation. In Manhattan, an
official explained that an ex-offender would have to get a form from
the state court system to submit with his registration application."' As
far as I know, no such form exists. The Queens Board asked for a
letter from the person's parole officer indicating that he had completed
his sentence. Now, a person registering legally would have completed
parole and thus no longer be meeting with his parole officer; in fact,
the would-be registrant may not have seen that officer for months or
even years. In Brooklyn, the election board employee could not
identify what document was required but insisted that a person
115. The New York City Election Board is composed of one Democrat and one
Republican commissioner for each of the five boroughs. Those are the ten commissioners
and they hire the executive director. The director is from one party, and the deputy director
from the other. The appointment structure is this: each county party nominates their
commissioner and the city board then votes to approve or reject. If they reject, the party
nominates someone else. If the party does not nominate someone else, then the council
members of that party can vote someone in. See About the BoardofElections, BOARD OF
ELECTIONS IN THE CITY OF N.Y, http://vote.nyc.ny.us/abouttheboard.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2011).
116. Wood & Bloom, supm note 13, at 3. By this time I had left the Brennan Center.
The follow-up survey was conducted by Democracy Program staff at the Brennan Center.
117. Boards of Elections Continue Illegally To Disfranchise Voters ith Felony
Convictions BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (Mar. 2006), http://www.brennancenter.org/page//d/downloadfile_34668.pdf; seeWood & Bloom, supra note 13, at 6.
118. Survey documents are on file with the author and at the Brennan Center.
119. Id.
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convicted of a felony must bring in "some document" to prove that he
has served his time.'20
Although not methodologically sophisticated, the basic findings
of the New York interviews are sufficiently credible to warrant serious
consideration of their legal and political implications. Notably, state
officials charged with overseeing the county boards did not contest the
basic finding of documentary disenfranchisement through local
practices.12' The New York interviews also raise questions about
whether these sorts of demands for documentation occur in other
jurisdictions.
B. DocunentaryDisenfdanchisementmSt. Louis,Missouni-2008
Years after I first encountered documentary disenfranchisement
in New York, I stumbled onto a similar practice in St. Louis, Missouri,
while doing voter protection work prior to the 2008 presidential
election. 12
Like New York, Missouri has codified laws that
disenfranchise those convicted of felonies for the duration of a
criminal sentence and restore voting rights after the sentence has been
served.123 During the registration period leading up to the 2008
presidential election, however, local voting rights attorneys discovered
that in the city of St. Louis, people with felony convictions who had
completed serving their sentences prior to 2007 were being prevented
from reregistering by the election board's demand for unspecified
documents.
120. Id. The 2005-2006 survey also found that in more than a third of New York
county offices (24), officials were either unsure (9) whether people on probation could vote
or stated definitely that they were ineligible (15). Again, officials in New York City were
among those misinformed. The respondent at the Queens Board was unsure of probationers'
voting status and officials at the Manhattan Board and the New York City Board of Elections
asserted that probationers are ineligible to register. Survey documents are on file at the
Brennan Center and with author. The disenfranchisement resulting from that error alone is
nontrivial-120,000 people are on probation in New York, half of them in New York City.
Wood & Bloom, supra note 13, at 3.
121. See Memo to Cnty. Comm'rs, supra note 111. Moreover, in July 2010, New York
passed a "public safety" bill that included a new initiative that will require correctional
facilities to notify people of their right to vote upon release. The notice provision appears to
be a recognition of and response to the rampant misinformation regarding voting eligibility
for those with felony convictions. It is unclear, however, how notice to the people with
convictions will correct election officials' views about voting eligibility after completion of
sentence, after a direct letter from the state election board to that effect failed to produce that
result. 2010 N.Y. Sess. Laws 56 (McKinney).
122. Letter from Denise Lieberman and Anthony E. Rothert to Scott Leiendecker and
Mary Wheeler-Jones, supm note 15.
123. Unlike New York, Missouri also disenfranchises people on probation. Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 115.133 (West 2011).
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As the attorneys explained in their letter to the St. Louis City
Board of Elections, "registrants who have finished serving sentences
have ... been instructed to present some non-specific documentation

showing that they are no longer under penal supervision before their
registration would be processed."' 24 As in New York, election officials'
demand for "some" document-in the absence of any administrative
process for identifying, let alone obtaining, the requested papers-was
so burdensome that it was tantamount to permanent disenfranchisement. In response to the lawyers' inquiry, St. Louis officials explained
that with the recent implementation of the statewide voter registration
database, they now receive positive notification of people coming off
parole, and, based on that notice, they restore their eligibility. They
argued, however, that there was no way for them to change the
"disqualified" status for any voter whose registration had been
suspended due to a felony conviction, and whose sentence had been
completed prior to 2007, without some comparable documentation or
notification. In the St. Louis officials' view, it was simply not possible
to make that shift without some legal text that warranted it.
Both the New York and St. Louis situations point out a particular
irony of legal administration, especially regarding databases and lists.
You might think that putting a "disqualified" marker next to a person's
name on a list, rather than removing her name altogether, would make
it easier to reinstate the registration, because the voter's original
registration record remains in the system where it can be reactivated
with the press of a button. But it turns out just the reverse is true. As a
St. Louis attorney explained, the marked name records serve instead to
create a kind of presumption of ineligibility. "[W]hen these voters
attempt to re-register after serving their time, the fact that their records
appear in the system as 'disqualified' is being used as a reason to block
their registrations ... .""2 Instead of simplifying reinstatement, "This
practice treats the ... 'disqualified' label as some kind of independent
evidence that a person is ineligible to register."'26
In both New York and St. Louis, election officials couched their
demands for documents as a matter of evidence of eligibility. In fact,
however, the St. Louis election officials were already in possession of
official proof that the registrants with felony convictions were eligible
to vote. The state produced an official list of people currently
124. Letter from Denise Lieberman and Anthony E. Rothert to Scott Leiendecker and
Mary Wheeler-Jones, supm note 15.
125. Id
12 6. Id.
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disenfranchised for felony conviction, and the would-be voters' names
were not on that list. The absence of a registrant's name, however,
apparently did not do the trick. As one of the lawyers for the
disenfranchised voters explained, "The city's argument is that unless
former felons present evidence that they are 'off paper,' the city has no
way of knowing that they are, in fact, not felons, and thus cannot
process their registrations.""'
City officials insisted that despite being provided with a list of
current felons against which they could match such registrations, they
could not reverse a disqualification for conviction without some
affirmative documentary text certifying the person's eligibility. They
continued to insist that without some positive certificate of eligibility,
the disqualified status marked in the voter database could not be
changed to reinstate the person as an eligible voter.'
C

The PossibilityofDocumentaryDisenfianchisement n Other
States

We may question whether practices similar to those uncovered in
New York and St. Louis are taking place elsewhere. Inquiries by
advocates and investigative journalists have turned up official practices
and beliefs that would result in permanent disenfranchisement despite
ostensibly temporary disenfranchisement laws.'29 Interviews conducted
by the Brennan Center and the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) in 2004 in New Jersey revealed that a third of election
officials there were demanding documentation from people with past
criminal convictions.'o Likewise in Washington State, 36% of election
officials interviewed asserted that people with felony convictions
needed to provide documentation from the court before being able to
register to vote.'' An earlier investigation in Minnesota noted the lack
of any administrative process for restoring voting rights at the end of a
127. E-mail from Denise Lieberman, Advancement Project, to author (Oct. 30, 2008,
10:38 PM EST) (on file with author).
128. Note that some state felony disenfranchisement statutes do require that
individuals released after completion of a criminal sentence receive written documents
indicating their renewed eligibility to vote. These documents take various forms. In Rhode
Island, a statute passed in 2006 requires that "the department of corrections shall notify that
[released] person in writing that voting rights will be restored." R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 179.2-3(c) (West 2010). The law further requires that those released receive a form notifying
them of their renewed eligibility along with a voter registration form which they must either
sign or decline in writing. Id.
129. See, eg., Wood& Bloom, supranote 13.
130. Id at 6; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:31-5 (West 2011).
131. Wood& Bloom, supranote 13, at6.
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criminal sentence and suggested that the lack of process might be
preventing large numbers of voters from having their voting eligibility
status restored in the state's registration system.' An Idaho newspaper
surveyed all forty-four county election districts and found that election
officials in almost a third of them did not know that people with felony
convictions regained the right to vote upon completion of sentence.
Others, like those in New York, required "special permission or
paperwork-from a judge or probation officer or lawyer-to restore a
person's voting rights."'"
There are also indications that criminal disenfranchisement laws
are administered in other ways that diverge from the laws on paper. In
a few cases, there is evidence that election officials mistakenly allow
people to vote when state statutes disqualify them. Two county
election boards in Pennsylvania mistakenly asserted that people with
felony convictions are allowed to vote by absentee ballot while in
prison there.'34 In South Carolina, one of the few states that disenfranchises misdemeanants, some election officials interviewed incorrectly
asserted that people in jail for misdemeanors could vote.'" There is
also confusion about who is barred from voting when serving a
sentence in the community. In a survey in Colorado, half of the local
officials interviewed incorrectly asserted that people on probation were
not eligible to vote.'
D. Politicaland Cultral InplicationsofDocunentary
Disenfianchisement
Recognizing documentary disenfranchisement refocuses the
picture of felony-voting bans' political meaning. Most basically, it
raises the possibility that many more Americans are prevented from
voting by these laws than standard accounts reveal. It does so in two
ways. First, the presence of documentary disenfranchisement indicates
that estimates of the disenfranchised population, based on who is
covered by statutes on the books, may significantly undercount the
Americans who are subject to disqualification when these voting bans
are administered. Equally important, documentary disenfranchisement
132. David Hawley, Ex-Felons'Right To Vote Reinforced ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Sept. 29, 2003, at BI.
133.

Wayne Hoffman, Some Counties May Not Let Felons Vote, IDAHO STATESMAN,

Aug. 25, 2003, at 1.
134. Wood& Bloom, supranote 13, at 5.
13 5. Id.
136. Id. at 3.
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shows that laws preventing voting by people with criminal convictions
have real life consequences-that people who otherwise would choose
to vote are locked out of the polls. Evidence of documentary
disenfranchisement thus raises doubts that state legislative changes
have reversed felony disenfranchisement's most serious antidemocratic
effects by shifting from permanent to temporary voting bans.
Moreover, the fact that election officials are turning away eligible
voters with criminal convictions tends to contradict a recent influential
study that concluded that permanent felony-voting bans do not
significantly depress African-American men's voting participation."'
1.

Documentary Disenfranchisement and Racial Vote Dilution

In claims of vote dilution, individuals who can themselves vote
argue that the power of their ballots is reduced because other likeminded citizens are prevented from voting. Such claims sometimes
face a causal question: What if those others would not have voted even
if they could?' In this vein, a well-known empirical study published
in 2004 by Thomas I Miles concluded that permanent felony
disenfranchisement has no discernible real-life effect on voter turnout
among African-American men, because most would not have voted
even if they had been reenfranchised.'39
Miles's voter turnout study entailed multiple comparisons of
voting rates of black and white men and women in different states, but
the basic point of comparison was between states with permanent
felony disenfranchisement laws on the books and those with only
temporary bans. That comparison showed that there were no
significant differences in African-American men's voting rates in states
with temporary and permanent felony disenfranchisement laws on the
books. From this result, the study concluded that permanent felonyvoting bans have no real impact on African-American group voting
power because African-American men who regain their voting rights
after temporary felony disenfranchisement simply choose not to
137. See Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisementand Voter Turnout 33 J. LEGAL
STuD. 85 (2004).
138. See, e g., Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div.,
28 F.3d 306, 310-16 (3d Cir. 1994) (upholding Pennsylvania's voter-purge law because there
was no evidence that discrimination or societal disadvantages had contributed to low minority
voter turnout); Salas v. Sw. Tex. Junior Coll. Dist., 964 E2d 1542, 1555-56 (5th Cir. 1992)
(finding no credible evidence that prior discrimination contributed to the low voter turnout
that caused Latinos' lack of electoral success and that the real cause of this lack of success
was not the challenged voting practice).
139. Miles, supra note 137, at 94.
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exercise those rights. Miles explained that "the absence of a
relationship between disenfranchisement and voter turnout" means that
in most statewide elections, banning voting by people with felony
records "has little consequence."o
The fact that New York election boards administer an ostensibly
temporary voting ban in a way that makes it permanent, however,
undermines the conclusion that people with felony convictions do not
vote even when the law permits it.14 ' Indeed, it suggests another
possible reason for the similar voting rates across permanent and
temporary disenfranchisement states: namely, that in states with
temporary disenfranchisement laws, people with felony convictions
continue to be prevented from voting by the practical administration of
these laws. That is, documentary disenfranchisement may be part of
the reason African-American men's voting rates remain low in
ostensibly temporary disenfranchisement states. If so, then the
uniformly low voter participation rates Miles found across states with
temporary and permanent disenfranchisement laws suggest not a lack
of vote dilution in states with permanent bans, but a more widespread
dilution effect in states with temporary bans on the books due to

140. Id
141. There are, of course, other responses to Professor Miles's conclusion that felony
disenfranchisement has no effect on African-American men's voting turnout because "when
given a choice, most felons choose not to vote." Id. at 89. Even without official practices
that turn temporary disenfranchisement permanent, low voter turnout by formerly
enfranchised African Americans with felony convictions would not necessarily be causally
unrelated to state disenfranchisement policies. For instance, the practice of disenfranchising
people who are under penal supervision in the community contributes to a person's alienation
from the electoral process, developing habits of nonvoting and identifying that person to the
community as a nonvoter, both of which might decrease the chances that person would act to
change that nonvoting status quo even after official barriers are removed.
Moreover, even if we were to accept Miles's characterization of low-voter turnout in
states with temporary disenfranchisement on the books as the result of individual choice, it
does not follow that individuals in states with permanent disenfranchisement regimes have
lost nothing. Crucially they have lost the right to choose. Many law-abiding Americans
choose not to exercise their voting rights, but still might not receive with equanimity the news
that those rights had been permanently cancelled. It is one thing to decide not to attend the
party and another not to be invited.
Finally, disenfranchisement has an expressive function as a kind of stigma that marks
people convicted of crimes as morally and socially unfit to contribute to the selection of our
government. Whether or not a voting ban actually changes a person's voting behavior, it can
change his standing in the community in his own and others' eyes. See Regina Austin, "The
Shame ofIt All" Stma and the PoliticalDisenf-nwchisement of Formerly Convicted and
IncarcemtedPersons,36 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 173, 177 (2004). As Austin points out,
for African Americans, that stigma is particularly potent as "a mark of inferiority that is
related to blacks' historic denial of the vote." Id
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documentary disenfranchisement.142 It may be that the voting patterns
of African-American men with felony convictions in New York and
Florida were similar not only because some New Yorkers who were
eligible to vote chose not to, but also because some who tried were
barred from voting by the election boards' demands for unobtainable
eligibility documents. The similar voting patterns revealed by Miles's
study may not reveal the inconsequential nature of lifelong felony
disenfranchisement so much as the extent to which its consequences
reach well beyond the few states with permanent voting bans on the
books.
A subsequent study of voting in Erie County, New York, provides
another glimpse of the interaction of criminal disenfranchisement and
community voting power-and how our incomplete information about
law's administration can lead to reasonable but erroneous assumptions
about law's effects.'43 The study involves data about registration and
voting by people with felony convictions in Erie County (the Buffalo
area) in 2004-2005; that is, in the period between the two surveys
reported here. The author of the Erie study notes the second (2005)
Brennan Center survey's finding that Erie officials allowed people
with felony convictions to reregister upon completion of their
sentences, with no demands for extra documentation. Based on that
information, the author asserts that in Erie County, "ex-felons are not
being barred from registering because of bureaucratic ignorance."'"
What the author of the Erie study could not know, because the
first Brennan Center survey was never published, was that in 2002,
Erie was one of the counties found to be demanding that people with
convictions produce some kind of certification of eligibility.14 Thus, it
appears that at some point between the first and second Brennan
Center surveys, the policy in Erie County changed. Though the
election official interviewed in 2005 professed no knowledge of the
October 2003 memo from the New York State Board directing local
boards to stop demanding documentation, the 2005 survey records
142. Miles did suggest a second "less persuasive" reason for the similarity between
voting rates in states with temporary and permanent bans: "laxity of enforcement." Miles,
supra note 137, at 116. There is no suggestion, however, that the study's counterintuitive
result might result from overenforcement of temporary disenfranchisement laws. Notably,
one of the study's temporary disenfranchisement comparison states was New York.
143. Michael V Haselswerdt, Con Job: An Estimate ofEx-Felon Voter Tumout Using
Document-BasedData,90 Soc. SC. Q. 262 (2009).
144. Id at 265.
145. On the records of the 2003 survey, two different officials are reported to assert
that if someone tried to register without a certificate, she would be rejected. Survey
documents are on file with the Brennan Center and author.
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note that the official "said she knew that the law mandating that felons
don't need to provide any documentary evidence that their sentence is
over was passed fairly recently."146
The Erie study's finding based on 2004-2005 voting patterns that
documentary disenfranchisement played no part in the low rates of
registration and voting seems questionable. At least until late 2002, the
Erie election board refused to register people with felony convictions
without (unobtainable) documentation. Even assuming that changed
in response to the State Board's October 2003 memorandum, Erie
residents completing felony sentences in 2004 (the subjects of the
survey) might very well have been familiar with the previous policy
and have had no notice of the change. In my experience, people with
convictions are often more knowledgeable than lawyers about how
laws relevant to their lives are actually being administered.'47
Familiarity with the recent Erie culture of documentary disenfranchisement might easily have depressed registration among those with
convictions in 2004-2005. It is thus hazardous to conclude that the
voting behavior of people with felony convictions in Erie County was
not influenced by administrative barriers to registration.
Moreover, the Erie article goes further-speculating about what
makes people with felony convictions so disinclined to vote. Brushing
aside the suggestion (attributed to Miles) that people with convictions
tend to come from "nonparticipatory demographic groups," the Erie
article concludes: "The findings in this study lend themselves to
another explanation; that there is something special about felons and
ex-felons that makes comparable groups difficult to find."'48 This
study not only views the low voting rates of people with criminal
convictions as independent of official acts, it dismisses the various
characteristics associated with low voting rates-for instance, poverty,
lack of education, and youth. Instead, the article suggests that people
with convictions might be "just different" from everyone else "when it
comes to civic duty."'49 Whatever its validity regarding the character of
14 6. Id.
147. SeeinfiaPartV
148 Haselswerdt, supranote 143, at 271.
149. Id. Yet another recent study concludes, based on self-reporting among young
people who have been arrested and in some cases incarcerated, that voting rates are
extraordinarily low among people with criminal convictions. Randi Hjalmarsson & Mark
Lopez, The Voting Behavior of Young DisenfranchisedFelons: Would They Vote If They
Could., 12 Am. L. & EcoN. REv. 356, 388-91 (2010). That study's methodology appears not
to include any possible consideration of the role of election administration practices like
documentary disenfranchisement.
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the criminally convicted, that last proposition certainly describes
accurately the way people with convictions were treatedby election
officials in Erie County, at least until sometime after fall 2002.
2.

Implications for Policy

Documentary disenfranchisement weakens the comfortable story
that states have effectively updated their disenfranchisement policies to
conform to popular opinion and to ameliorate what is now seen as
antidemocratic thinning of state electorates.'o No doubt reforms have
reenfranchised some people. But documentary disenfranchisement
makes those reforms look less dramatic. If new ostensibly temporary
voting bans remain de facto permanent, felony disenfranchisement
must be taking a bigger bite out of state electorates-especially the
African-American electorate-than is apparent in the conventional
picture. In sum, state legislative and executive measures implemented
since the 1970s may have failed to reverse the draconian electoral
effects of permanent disenfranchisement during and after the war on
crime.
The first practical recommendation in response to evidence of
documentary disenfranchisement must surely be to conduct
methodologically rigorous studies to determine how common such
practices really are. At this point, even the potential numbers of
Americans affected are unknown. Surprisingly, given all the attention
paid recently to the rising number of Americans under penal
supervision, there are few reliable estimates of the population who has
actually completed serving a criminal sentence. A recent analysis,
however, estimates that across the country "11.7 million former felons
live and work among us every day."'
So, if documentary
disenfranchisement is widespread, it could affect millions of
Americans. If the practices uncovered in New York reach even one in
four of the 11.7 million former felons, then the conventional estimate
of five million disenfranchised would rise to eight million.'52
150. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 39, at 1. ("In recent years significant reforms in
felony disenfranchisement policies have been achieved at the state level.").
151. Uggen, Manza & Thompson, supranote 77, at 281.
152. Some of those 11.7 million Americans are covered by permanent bans on the
books in some states (and thus are already included in the conventional estimate of 5.3
million disenfranchised). See Felony DisenfianchisementLaws, supra note 7. Others live in
the twelve states that bar disenfranchisement only during incarceration. In those states,
overenforcement seems less likely because the line is more clearly drawn between a loss of
voting rights in prison and renewed eligibility upon release. However, there is some
confusion in Colorado about voting rights on probation. Wood & Bloom, supra note 13, at 3.
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The possibility that documentary disenfranchisement may bar
from the polls significant numbers of Americans, in addition to those
already disenfranchised on paper, has both practical and theoretical
implications. For voting rights advocates, confirmation of widespread
documentary disenfranchisement would mean that refocusing
education, adjudication, and advocacy on these practices could
potentially reenfranchise as many people as additional state legislative
reforms. On the other hand, if documentary disenfranchisement is
confined to only a handful of states or portions of states, it would make
sense to concentrate efforts in those places, which would effectively
constitute additional pockets of permanent disenfranchisement. Where
state governments agree that impracticable demands for documents
overenforce voting bans intended to be temporary, there would be a
clear priority for advocates and government to work together to
develop workable administrative procedures and to educate officials on
how to administer the laws as written.
As for legislative reform, documentary disenfranchisement takes
the focus off simply codifying temporary disenfranchisement. It
suggests instead the need to provide for a clear-cut administrative
The
process through which to accomplish reenfranchisement.
practices in New York and St. Louis further suggest that different
structures of criminal disenfranchisement impose different
administrative costs. In particular, disenfranchising citizens who are
serving sentences in the community likely adds significant
administrative cost, by creating ambiguity about the eligibility status of
individuals who attempt to register after being disqualified by a
criminal conviction. Those costs might argue for reenfranchising
people on parole and probation. To remove that ambiguity, states
could choose to draw a practical line linking voting rights to
community residence, so that any person able to provide an address
outside prison could be presumed not to be disenfranchised on account
of any history of criminal conviction."'
Documentary disenfranchisement also suggests some additional
administrative steps states might take to ensure that codified reforms
But in twenty-eight states people convicted of felonies lose their voting rights for the duration
of incarceration and during at least some forms of community supervision. And, besides
New York, those include some states with large populations: for example, California,
Connecticut, New Jersey, and Texas.
153. Fourteen jurisdictions currently utilize this structure. They are Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah and the District of Columbia. Felony Disenllznchisement
Laws, supm note 7.
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are put into practice. For example, although the Federal Help America
Vote Act (HAVA) requires states to create an administrative
mechanism for removing voters convicted of felonies from their active
registration lists, the statute contains no requirement for administering
those voters' return to eligible voting status.'5 4 Documentary disenfranchisement emphasizes the shortsightedness of that omission and the
need for states to fill the gap. States should make sure their HAVAmandated centralized voter registration databases include mechanisms
for removing coded disqualifications placed next to voters' names
when they are convicted of felonies and reinstating voters to active
registration status after their sentences are complete.' 5
The move to temporary disenfranchisement was driven by a
number of different factors. One is a widely shared view that
disenfranchising citizens beyond a term of criminal punishment is
irrational and unfair. Public opinion in the United States seems to have
turned definitively against lifelong criminal voting bans. Polls indicate
that some 80% of Americans oppose lifelong felony disenfranchisement.' On the other hand, most respondents were in favor of taking
away voting rights while people are in prison.'" Thus states' move to
legislate temporary bans appears to mirror public attitudes.
Documentary disenfranchisement troubles that congruence. If
state legislators want to create policies that genuinely reflect popular
approval for reenfranchising people who have completed their
sentences, they will need to think further about how to accomplish that
goal. One strategy would be to allow voting while on probation and
reenfranchise automatically after incarceration, so that election
officials know that anyone not in prison has gotten his or her rights
back. If, however, state legislators want to keep people on parole and
probation from voting, that makes binding regulations about the
process of reenfranchisement necessary to be sure that officials
enforcing the process are being true to its temporary nature.

154. 42 U.S.C. § 15483 (2006).
155. As noted above, Rhode Island has such a requirement, as does New Mexico.
156. See Manza, Brooks & Uggen, supm note 8, at 280. The studies also show some
support for enfranchising people who are on probation or parole. Of course, like all opinion
polls, the results of these are subject to some variation depending on how the questions are
framed. So, for instance, when people are asked specifically whether they believe that "sex
offenders" should regain the right to vote, the approval numbers plummet. Seeid.at 280-81;
see also Pinaire, Heumann & Bilotta, supm note 8.
157. Only 31% of respondents supported enfranchising prisoners. Manza, Brooks &
Uggen, supm note 8, at 280, tbl. 1.
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Policy makers also need to weigh the virtues and problems of
paperless "automatic" reenfranchisement with those of a system that
requires some form of paper proof of eligibility. Automatic methods
have been seen by most voting rights advocates as ideal, because any
paper certification process requires people completing penal sentences
to obtain and hold onto documents. Currently, many states do not
provide any documentation of a completed criminal sentence. Even if
such documents were routine, many advocates believe it is unrealistic
to expect someone coming out of prison to prioritize retaining a piece
of paper as they cope with all the social and logistical hurdles of
creating a new life outside. Reenfranchisement at some later point,
say, after a period of parole, raises other hurdles. For instance, many
individuals in such situations do not have a reliable mailing address.
For all these reasons, "automatic" reenfranchisement-that is, some
form of database management that records individuals' eligibility
status-has been seen as the better alternative. But the experience
with documentary disenfranchisement points out that there are
downsides. Apart from the fact that people with no prior voting record
would have to be listed in some new category, it may be that election
officials' demands for documents reflect a more widespread cultural
sense that documentation is integral to the legal process that
transforms a convict into an enfranchised citizen. If so, rather than
attempting to rationalize away that intuition, it may be better to satisfy
it.
E

Cultura ImplicationsofDocumentaiyDisenfianchisement: The
PerformativeRole ofLegal Text

In one sense, election officials' refusal to carry out the statutory
command to reenfranchise people who have completed serving their
criminal sentences appears to defy the statutory text they are charged
with enforcing."' That is, they imposed an (unmeetable) obligation to
produce documents the law did not require. But I want to suggest,
rather, that the officials may have been responding faithfully to another
aspect of legal text-in particular, to a sense that the documentation
that surrounds criminal conviction not only records but also
accomplishes disenfranchisement-in ways that cannot be undone
without more documents.

158. An alternative view may be that this is a reasonable request for evidence of
changed eligibility status-or classic bureaucratic self-protection.
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As J.L. Austin explained, besides expressing meaning, language
has the capacity to perform actions.'" For instance, a written
declaration of war both communicates certain instructions (mass the
troops, open the weapons stores) and in and of itself performs an act
that dramatically changes social reality: taking a country to war.'"
The "performative" or "illocutionary" act, as Austin called it, is
accomplished through our conventional understanding of language,
whether or not the speaker or author of the words intended to
accomplish it."' Less dramatically, Austin points out that a person who
says "I promise to . . ." has promised to do something, whether or not

she has any intention of carrying out her
performative power of words-while
restrictions-is independent of the subjective
Words do what they do, whether or not their

promise."' That is, the
subject to contextual
intentions of their author.
author means them to do

it.

It may be that the election officials' requests for certificates of
renewed eligibility are driven in part by a sensitivity to the
performative power of legal text to transform social and legal status.
The state employs a heavily ritualized process to transform citizens
into convicts, and that process is replete with formal papersjudgments of conviction, verdict sheets, plea agreements, sentencing
reports. Perhaps it is not surprising then, that local officials would
assume that some formal legal document was needed to reverse that
transformation. Election officials may be treating would-be voters
with criminal records as though their citizenship status has been
transformed performatively through documents of legal power and can
only be restored with the help of more legal text. They may believe
that in our legal culture, a person with a felony conviction-and its
attendant loss of political rights-cannot move back from "the penal
state" to New York State without some kind of official document, a
passport if you like, to carry him across that boundary.
The kind of performative action I am positing here obviously is
similar to the speech acts Austin theorized. In this case, however, the
performative act is less at the level of the text-that is, the words-and
more at the level of the document. Rather than the meaning of the
words performing the verbal act, the document itself performs. Or,

159.
160.
161.
162.

AusTIN, supm note 17, at 6-7.
See id.at 7.
Seeid.at6-7.
Id.at 11.
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rather, in the absence of a document, the legal act of reenfranchisement
goes unperformed.'
To be sure, election officials' demands for documentation may be
motivated, at least in part, by a desire for documentary evidence rather
than documentary performance. Perhaps election officials were
doubtful that the people who were trying to register had really regained
eligibility to vote. In fact it is not entirely clear exactly how the
election officials subjectively viewed their own documentary demands.
Doubts about a lack of documentary proof and a lack of performative
power may combine and mutually reinforce each other."
As a logical point, or as a way to clarify the multiple roles played
by legal language, it is important to distinguish between written
evidence of a legal transaction and the situation when a legal act is
performed by the writing of the document and its attendant rituals.'
But in describing legal administrative practices or culture, it may be
inaccurate to suggest that officials or other legal practitioners make a
firm conscious distinction between the evidentiary and performative
uses of legal documents. The performative aspect of the officials'
demands for proof is particularly stark in the St. Louis case. There,
officials had other evidence that the would-be voters had completed
their sentences and were indeed eligible. That evidence was the
absence of the registrants' names from the official list of currently
disqualified felons. Nevertheless, confronted with a disqualifying
mark next to the voters' names in the database, election officials took
the position that they were powerless to reclassify the voter without
positive documentation of eligibility.
From these officials' perspective, it may be unimportant whether
that inevitably accompanying document is playing an evidentiary or a
performative role, or some kind of hybrid of the two. In both the New
York interviews and the arguments of the St. Louis Board, there was a
sense that local officials had the idea that when a person gets out of

163. Alternatively, we might see the election officials' demands as themselves enacting
a legal status change-that is, as disenfranchisingindividuals who had been reenfranchised,
or at least regained their voting eligibility, by completing their sentences.
164. A sensitivity to this kind of dual documentary function might help illuminate
other current controversies about laws requiring certain forms of legal documentation. I am
thinking here particularly about both the current raging controversy over voter ID laws and of
laws requiring the production of certain documents to establish that one is not an illegal
immigrant, that is, not one of "the undocumented."
165. See, e.g., PETER M. TIERSMA, PARCHMENT PAPER PIXELS: LAW AND THE
TECHNOLOGIES OF CoMMuNIcATION 34-36 (2010).
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prison or off parole there must be some document that accompanies
that change.
Earlier I compared the documents sought by election officials to
a passport. Now a passport is certainly evidence of identity, a way for
officials at a border to be sure that the traveler is who she says she is,
and, perhaps more importantly, that she is not some potentially
threatening other. But a passport is not only evidentiary. At the same
time that it provides evidence of the bearer's status as a legitimate
visitor who can safely be welcomed, it helps to constitute that status.
Through the process of getting the passport, and through the process of
marking and checking the passport at borders-through all the various
steps, rituals, and interactions with government officials that take
place-the passport bearer becomes a legitimate traveler.
The St. Louis officials couched their documentary demands in
terms of evidence of eligibility, saying that unless people with
convictions proved that they were "off paper"-that is, had completed
their parole-the election board could not treat them as eligible."' As
an evidentiary matter, however, this was irrational, because the city
election board was provided with an official list of currently ineligible
felons, against which they could match registration applications. If the
concern were only proof, the absence of the names on the list would be
evidence that could weigh as heavily as the existence of a mark next to
the registrants' names on another list."' Despite acknowledging that
evidence, however, the board continued to insist that without positive
documentation certifying that a person had regained her eligibility,
there was no way to process her application because of the
"disqualified" marker by her name in the database.
Likewise, New York officials, confronted with the disqualifying
code "4" next to would-be registrants' names, refused to accept their
applications and demanded documentary proof The same officials
made no such demand when a person previously registered in New
York State lost that registration because of a move out of state and then
reregistered upon return.'" It is possible that election officials simply
mistrusted would-be voters with felony convictions and so required
166. E-mail from Denise Lieberman, supm note 127.
167. Note that there is no more reason to think that a name has been erroneously left
off a list of currently ineligible felons than there is to think that a name on the list of eligible
voters has been erroneously marked as ineligible.
168. In this regard, it is interesting to note that, after the New York interview took
place, the Federal Help America Vote Act established a requirement of documentation when a
person votes for the first time at a new polling place. There remains no requirement of
documentation at the registration stage, however. See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(1) (2006).
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additional evidence of eligibility. But the difference in treatment is
consistent with a performative perspective.
Voters who move out of state have voluntarily changed their
registration status, or had it changed through a voluntary act that is not
generally regarded as primarily "legal." When you change your
address, you give up your eligibility to vote in your old precinct. You
may not particularly want to change your voting district, and you may
even regret that aspect of the move, but you accept the change as a
kind of legal side effect of some other, primarily nonlegal, voluntary
act. Criminal disenfranchisement, on the other hand, is something that
is done to you, and done in a particular legal fashion. As a
performative matter, it makes sense that a status transformation
accomplished through voluntary action could be voluntarily reversed
by a voter simply moving back to her old address. One voluntary act
erases another. But the transformation from citizen to convict takes
place involuntarily-through a series of legal rituals and documents.
Thus the lack of legal documents of reenfranchisement may trigger
doubts about a convicted person's eligibility, not just because of
suspicions about the truth of his or her assertion that his or her
sentence is complete. It may also reflect a legal-cultural understanding
that some kind of legal instrument or technique involving the
performative power of documents is necessary to restore the rights of
citizenship that were taken away through other legal documents.
Even if the New York and St. Louis officials' attitudes toward the
missing documents of reenfranchisement can be described in terms of
Austin's performative language, there are some crucial differences.
First, it appears that the officials' view blurs the distinction between
documentary texts as performative speech acts that accomplish
changes in legal status and documentary texts that provide evidence of
status changes accomplished by some other means. In contrast,
Austin's project was to distinguish language's meaning from its
performative force. Second, note the shift from Austin's focus on the
specific language of sentences-which may be spoken or written, and
which he usually refers to as "utterances"-to a focus on the need for a
writing of some kind.'" In the world of election administration, it was
clear that what was sought was some kind of written documentation.
In fact, the writing itself was more important than exactly what
the document would say. Of course not just any legal document would
do. It would have to make some kind of statement regarding
169. AusTIN,supmnote 17, at 11.
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reenfranchisement or the completion of criminal punishment; a person
disenfranchised due to a conviction could not hand officials a parking
ticket or a tax bill to establish his renewed voting eligibility. But the
text of the document might be read in any other context as
representing, rather than changing reality; for example, "Mr. Smith has
completed serving his sentence and is eligible to vote." To the extent
that what the officials sought was a reenfranchising speech act, it was
less a question of needing language whose structure indicated a
specific speech act-for example, "Mr. Smith is hereby deemed to
have completed his criminal sentence and regained his status as a fullfledged member of the polity"-and more a matter of having "some"
document (as the Brooklyn election official put it) to materialize
renewed eligibility, almost as though the document itself was expected
to perform, rather than the words in it.
Third, the officials have made a logical step beyond Austin's
insight that certain utterances can themselves carry out actions.
Austin's work goes to show that in certain circumstances, including
legal contexts, sayngsomething can make it so. The election officials,
however, acted as if not saying something (or not writing it) makes it
not so.'"
In this light, election administrators' requests for written proof of
eligibility highlight the central role of legal writing in both enacting
and certifying transformations of social status and in structuring
interactions with government institutions empowered to conduct those
enactments."' It may be that the heightened value of documents and
the obsessive attention to documentation that are characteristic of
bureaucratic systems exemplify a more general conflation of the power
170. I am reminded of the inversion that Victorian anthropologists attributed to
"primitive" practitioners of magic, who were said to have mistaken the direction of the causal
arrow and thus to believe that without the cock's crow, the sun would fail to rise. See
EDwARD BURNETrTYLOR, THE ORIGINS OF CULTURE 116(1958).
Man, as yet in a low intellectual condition, having come to associate in thought
those things which he found by experience to be connected in fact, proceeded
erroneously to invert this action, and to conclude that association in thought must
involve similar connexion in reality. He thus attempted to discover, to foretell, and
to cause events by means of processes which we can now see to have only an ideal
significance.
Id
171. As Michel de Certeau suggests, in other areas of society besides law, writing has
achieved the status of "a 'modem' mythical practice." MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF
EVERYDAY LIFE 133 (Steven F. Rendall trans., 1984). The practice of writing, as opposed to
oral communication, Certeau argues, aims at social construction-making rather than
reporting reality; written text "refers to the reality from which it has been distinguished m
orderto change it." Id.at 135.
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of written text to verify status with the power to construct status
changes. Whether or not evidentiary issues were also at stake, the
election boards' demands suggest an understanding of legal text as the
vehicle through which legal status is enacted. In this view, once a legal
act is accomplished through text, it cannot be reversed without some
subsequent positive textual act. The text-heavy process of conviction
is one such act that both produces and reflects criminal conviction as a
resilient change in status.
It seems that performative legal texts play multiple roles in
constituting and maintaining the boundaries between citizens and
"felons," "ex-felons," "criminals," and "convicts." Stripping a citizen
of the capacity to perform certain legal acts through disenfranchisement is part of a process of separating that person from civil society in
terms of identity as well as geography. Then, when the disenfranchised person returns to his geographic community, doubts about his
identity remain, which, in turn, may lead to further legal separation
from the community in the form of documentary disenfranchisement.
Note also how documentary disenfranchisement reinforces the legal
and cultural status of people with felony convictions as a group apart,
that is, by denying them access to another kind of legal performance
involving written legal text, namely voting. Ballots are quintessential
"speech acts" that both express a citizen's governmental preferences
and, at the same time, work through collective legal-performative force
to transform another citizen's status from candidate into congressman
or president.
Voting is a central political ritual of our society in which
individuals and groups both exercise and attain the status of full
citizenship by commanding the performative power of legal text.
Under documentary disenfranchisement, people with felony
convictions remain free to express their political preferences, but they
are denied this performative power. They may wear campaign buttons,
sign petitions, and write political tracts, but they are forbidden the
scriptural act of "casting their votes" and excluded from the ritual
transformation of candidates into governors. The loss of this
performative legal and political power, in turn, contributes to the
perception of disenfranchised individuals as liminal (that is,
borderline) figures-living betwixt and between the states of convict
and citizen-and so reinforces election officials' decisions to treat
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them differently. 72 That borderline status in turn revitalizes the sense
that someone with a felony conviction is not a regular citizen and
should therefore be required to produce documents with which to
prove-or to enact-his renewed voting eligibility and return to
society at large.
It is striking how at every turn both legal actors and observers
simultaneously reify and deny the role of legal practices in the political
and civic alienation of individuals convicted of crimes. One might
frame the demand for nonexistent or hard-to-obtain documentary
credentials as a performative act of disenfranchisement, but election
officials seem to see it differently. They present their demands as
either declining to exercise their legal power for lack of proof of the
applicant's legal status or as expressing their legal incapacity to restore
a convicted person's voting power without the vehicle of enfranchising
legal documents. When Thomas Miles observed similarly low voting
rates in both formally temporary and permanent disenfranchisement
jurisdictions, his first explanation was that people with convictions
choose not to vote even when the law allows it.' 3 He also considered
the possibility of a lack of enforcement of permanent disenfranchisement laws. 74 In both these scenarios, law is passive and people with
convictions behave badly-either failing in their civic duty of political
participation or attempting to participate illegitimately. The possibility
that official legal action might be actively contributing to the political
alienation of people with convictions is overlooked.
Nevertheless, though he focused on individual choice, Miles
certainly left open the possibility that low-voting rates were in part a
result of the experience of criminal disenfranchisement.
Two
subsequent studies of voting after conviction go much farther toward
naturalizing the legal status of conviction as a kind of manifestation of
an individual's latent character. The author of the study in Erie County
speculates that there is "something special" about convicted

172. The reference to a "liminal," literally threshold, state invokes the work of Arnold
van Gennep, a Belgian anthropologist working around the turn of the twentieth century who
noted the three-part structure of many different rituals, particularly initiation rites, which he
called "rites of passage." ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE (Monika B. Vizedom
& Gabrielle L. Caffee trans., 1960). According to van Gennep, rituals that transform
individuals' social status do so in three predictable phases: "(1) separation,(2) margin or
Amen, and (3) reagggation. Sometimes he simply called these: 'preliminal,' 'liminal,' and
'postliminal."' VICTOR TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS, AND METAPHORS: SYMBOLIC ACTION IN
HUMAN SOCIETY 196 (1974).

173. Miles, supmnote 137, at 115.
174. Id.atll6.
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individuals that causes low voting rates.' Another study observes that
young people who have been incarcerated report voting at lower rates
than those who have merely been arrested, and suggests that the cause
may not be "the interactions with the justice system themselves," or
even demographic factors, like low educational attainment, but rather
some "unobservable heterogeneity.""' The study's authors then
proceed to this rather stunning projection of the processes of law
enforcement into the character of those in whose lives those processes
have forcefully intervened: "[I]t appears that the more criminal an
individual is (i.e., incarceration versus arrest), the less likely he is to
vote."'" In this account, permanent political exile is neither a lingering
result of a person's "interaction" with criminal disenfranchisement nor
a personal choice, but a sort of symptom or side effect of criminality,
which is conceived as a context-free individual characteristic"something special" that separates the criminally disenfranchised from
their fellow citizens. The performative and experiential force of the
legal acts of arrest, conviction, incarceration, and disenfranchisement
(to say nothing of the practical effects of these events on individual
lives) is presented as a passive reflection of the "systematic differences
between felons and nonfelons."'78
IV. PERFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
The performative analysis of county election officials' demands
for eligibility documents may offer insights into another area of legal
practice, one that is generally regarded as quite separate from such
"ground level" administration-judges' modes of constitutional
interpretation. Before dismissing the St. Louis and New York officials'
behavior as typical of low-level bureaucracy, we should consider the
similarity between their refusal to accept voting registration
applications from people disenfranchised by felony convictions and
federal courts' refusal to allow challenges to felony disenfranchisement
laws. I will argue that recent federal court decisions forbidding
challenges to felony disenfranchisement under the VRA take an
approach to the Fourteenth Amendment that has something in
175. Haselswerdt, supm note 143, at 271; see also discussionsupra Part III.D.1.
176. Hjalmarsson & Lopez, supra note 149, at 360.
177. See id at 377. To appreciate the breathtaking extent to which the authors of this
last remark are willing to write off as marked by "systematic differences" anyone who has
been arrested, recall that the "individuals" described are teenagers and young people whose
average age is twenty-two and whose arrests and incarcerations occurred when they were
between the ages of twelve and twenty-four.
178. Id.at 378.
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common with local election officials' approach to documents of
conviction.
A.

Richardson &s'
Onginabst Interpretation

In Richardson v Ranirez the Supreme Court turned back an
equal protection challenge to felony disenfranchisement,"' based
primarily on the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause." As evidence of that intent, the Court focused on
the Amendment's exemption of criminal voting bans in the Reduction
in Representation Clause.'"' That relatively obscure portion of the
Fourteenth Amendment created an interim political remedy for racially
discriminatory disenfranchisement (until the Fifteenth Amendment
outlawed racial voting bans eighteen months later).' It provides that a
state's representation in Congress will be reduced proportionate to the
percentage of men whose right to vote is denied "or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other cre"
Simply put, the Court in Richardsonheld that the framers and ratifiers
of the Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended to outlaw,
under the guarantee of equal protection, what they exempted from the
lesser penalty of Reduction in Representation.'"
Richardson is an originalist opinion, interpreting "equal
protection" by analyzing what the Fourteenth Amendment meant when
179. 418 U.S. 24, 55-56 (1974).
180. The Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1.
181. The Amendment further states:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of
age in such State.
Id amend. XIV § 2 (footnote omitted).
182. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
183. Id.amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
184. 418 U.S. at 55.
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it was adopted in 1868. Unlike the textualist originalism championed
nowadays by Justice Scalia, Richardsonfocuses on the original intent
The
of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers and ratifiers.'
Richardson opinion (by Justice Rehnquist) derives the Fourteenth
Amendment's application to felony disenfranchisement largely through
investigations of the intent of the Amendment's framers that go well
outside the constitutional text. The opinion considers the history of the
discussions leading up to text's enactment, the text of other
contemporaneous enactments, and the text of the Amendment itselfall as evidence of the Amendment's original intent. Ultimately, the
Court finds "persuasive" the contention that "those who framed and
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended to
prohibit outright in § 1 of that Amendment that which was expressly
exempted from the lesser sanction of reduced representation imposed
by § 2 of the Amendment."'"
To be sure, there are textualist elements in the opinion. The
Court begins by analyzing a specific phrase and the meaning that
"would appear from its face."" Moreover, the opinion expresses
skepticism about the project of determining the very collective intent it
seeks: "The problem of interpreting the 'intention' of a constitutional
provision is, as countless cases of this Court recognize, a difficult
one."' Those internal quotation marks are telling. At the least they
mark the recognition that the opinion's interpretive project is
something different from a straightforward psychological, historical
inquiry into the actual thoughts of some specific writers or endorsers
Nevertheless, the Court
of the Reconstruction Amendment.
undertakes an avowedly intentionalist inquiry.
The argument from intent is not optional to the logic of
Richardson. The opinion rests on an argument about the framers'
understanding of the textual relations between the Amendment's
exemption of criminal disenfranchisement and the guarantee of equal
protection, based on numerous external sources, not on an independent
assessment of what the Amendment's language itself entails. In other
words, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment says only that criminal
disenfranchisement is exempt from the penalty of reduced
185. Id. at 41-56; see SCALIA, supra note 16, at 38 ("What I look for in the
Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not
what the original draftsmen intended."); see also John F Manning, Textualism and Legislative
Inten4 91 VA. L. REv. 419 (2005).
186. Richardson,418U.S. at43.
18 7. Id.
18 8. Id.
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representation. Richardson, in contrast, says that criminal disenfranchisement is (at least presumptively) constitutional, regardless of
remedy. To make that point, the opinion makes inferences about the
intent of the amendment, concluding that its drafters and ratifiers
meant to extend the exemption from the single remedy referenced to
all others.
The Richardson approach is in some ways the mirror image of
the extreme textualism of, say, Robert Bork's originalist understanding
of equal protection articulated in The Tempting ofAmeica." Bork
argues that, despite the fact that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment thought segregation was permissible, by adopting "equal
protection" in the constitutional text, they created a textual requirement
of integration that trumps their own intent. The Constitution's textual
protection of criminal disenfranchisement appears only as the
exemption from the penalty of reduced congressional representation in
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court wants the support
of an intentionalist argument in order to justify reading broader
protections into that textual reference.
There is no semantic argument here that the phrase "or other
crime" in Section 2 creates an express exemption from the subsequent
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. After all, as one federal
judge has pointed out, "[T]hat provision simply states that
disenfranchised felons, unlike other persons disenfranchised by the
States, are to be included within the census for purposes of
apportioning representatives."' Richardson reasons that despite the
textual structure limiting the exemption of criminal disenfranchisement to the penalty of reduced representation in Section 2 of the
Amendment, that exemption reveals an intent to approve criminal
disenfranchisement against a per se equal protection challenge under
Section 1. The exemption in Section 2 is read as evidence that the
people who wrote and ratified both sections "could not have intended"
to protect criminal disenfranchisement under one and not the other.
Whereas Bork argued that constitutional text trumped intent,
Richardsonreasons that the text illuminates intent. Bork stressed the
performative power of constitutional text, but Richardson reads the
text, and other sources, for evidence of the constitution's expressive
intent.

LAw

189. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
(1990).
190. SinmonsIf 575 F3d 24, 53 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., dissenting).
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Richardson looks to historical documents to see whether the
constitutional text 'except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime,' was intended to have a different meaning than would appear
from its face.""' Because history does not contradict what the Court
takes to be the "facial" meaning of those words (that is, that they refer
to criminal disenfranchisement in general, as opposed to only crimes
associated with aid to the Confederacy), then the presumptive
constitutionality of criminal disenfranchisement is confirmed.
The point is further borne out by a subsequent opinion, also
authored by Justice Rehnquist, holding that a state's deliberate racially
discriminatory use of criminal disenfranchisement violated equal
protection.'92 In Hunter v Underwood the Court struck down a voting
ban crafted selectively to disenfranchise on the basis of crimes thought
Hunter
to be more commonly committed by African Americans.'
the
vote
to
deny
of
§
2
authorization
implicit
"the
despite
explains that
to citizens for participation in rebellion, or other crime," that phrase
"was not designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimination" that
animated Alabama's law, and which "otherwise violates § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 94 Moreover, in the opinion's last line the
Court flatly states: "Nothing in our opinion in Richardson v Ramirez
... suggests the contrary."'" After Hunter it is clearer still that
Richardson'srejection of a broad, nonracial equal protection challenge
to criminal disenfranchisement is based on a theory of original
intent.96
Of course Richardson's originalist reasoning is open to criticism.
In the first place, there are many constitutional interpreters (including
some on the Court when Richardson was decided and some on the
191. 418 U.S. at 43 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2). In particular, the Court
analyzes the Reconstruction Act and the "enabling acts" that in 1868 and 1870 were passed to
readmit ex-Confederate states back to the Union. Id. at 48-52. Unsurprisingly, then, Justice
Rehnquist frames the textual analysis as an attempt to test the petitioner's argument "that
those who framed and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment could not have htended to
prohibit outright in § 1 of that Amendment that which was expressly exempted from the
lesser sanction of reduced representation imposed by § 2 of the Amendment." Id. at 43
(emphasis added).
192. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
193. Id.at 232.
194. Id.at 233 (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id.(citation omitted).
196. To be sure, Richardsonhas textualist aspects. The opinion focuses on a specific
phrase in the Amendment and declares that pursuit of the framers' intent regarding those
words is only to confirm their "plain reading." 418 U.S. at 45. Moreover, the opinion
expresses skepticism about the realistic possibility of determining the "intent" of a collective
process like the framing and ratification of a constitutional amendment. Id at 55.
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Court today) who reject original intent and/or original meaning as
guides to constitutional interpretation in general.'
Second,
with
conflicts
approach
intent
original
framed
Richardson's narrowly
the Supreme Court's reasoning in other equal protection and voting
rights cases. As Laurence Tribe observes, even if the Reduction in
Representation Clause "establishes that the framers accepted the
disenfranchisement of those convicted of crimes," it does not follow
that disenfranchisement is warranted under the Equal Protection
Clause, which the Court has never limited to its framers' political
views.'
The Court's late twentieth-century voting rights jurisprudence
was all about interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to protect a
changing concept of voting rights. The modem cases reflect a shift
away from the earlier view of voting as a privilege for the deserving
few to the identification of voting as the sine qua non of democratic
citizenship, a "fundamental" right presumptively enjoyed by all unless
their disenfranchisement was necessitated by some unusually strong
("compelling") government interest.' As Justice Marshall pointed out
in his Richardson dissent, by the time Richardson was decided, the
Court had already struck down as unconstitutional another voting
qualification-one-year residency requirements-specifically approved
(in the Reconstruction Act) by the same Congress that passed the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 00 On the logic of the Court's canonical voting
rights cases, "[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the
political theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are
unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to
historic notions of equality."20'
Third, if original intent were the criterion for protecting African
Americans' voting rights under the Equal Protection Clause, that
protection would be scant. The only reason that the Fourteenth
197. See, e.g., id. at 72-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Breyer, supo note 16.
198. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1094 (2d ed. 1988).
199. Moreover, the "inclusion equals meaning" argument fails because it ignores what
Ronald Dworkin points out as the crucial distinction "between what someone means to say
and what he hopes or expects or believes will be the consequence for the law of his saying it."
Whetherand How Roe ShouldBe Ovenle4 59 U.
Ronald Dworkin, UnenumeratedRi 9ts:
CHI. L. REV. 381, 385 (1992). Even if the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment, by
exempting felony disenfranchisement from the Reduction in Representation Clause,
expressed their general approval of that practice, it does not follow that they intended to
forbid judges to disapprove felony disenfranchisement in any and all circumstances, or even
to immunize criminal voting bans from all equal protection challenges.
200. 418 U.S. at 76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
201. Id.(quoting Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966)).
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Amendment had to have a Reduction in Representation Clause at all
was that at the time it was adopted, the guarantee of Equal Protection
was not understood to bar unequal voting qualifications-even overt
racial voting bans. To the contrary, approximately two years later the
Reconstruction Congress deemed it necessary to pass the Fifteenth
Amendment to outlaw direct racial disenfranchisement.202 To the
extent that one relies on the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment, then, it should rule out equal protection challenges to
every voting qualification, or at least all equal protection challenges to
racial inequality in voting.203 But in fact such challenges are a staple of
the Court's twentieth-century voting rights jurisprudence, which treats
racial discrimination in voting as a violation of both the Fifteenth
Amendment's ban against abridging voting rights "on account of race"
and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.2 0
Perhaps in part to finesse these problems with its original intent
rationale, Justice Rehnquist's Richardson opinion stresses the special
status conferred on felony disenfranchisement by the Fourteenth
Amendment's specific textual reference to "crime":
Unlike most claims under the Equal Protection Clause, for the
decision of which we have only the language of the Clause itself as it is
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, respondents' claim implicates
not merely the language of the Equal Protection Clause of § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but also the provisions of the less familiar §2
of the Amendment. . . .20'
The opinion focuses repeatedly on the simple existence of the
words, "or other crime," in the constitutional text. In so doing,
without ever arguing it directly, the opinion develops the idea that
the reference to crime in the "express language" of the Fourteenth
202. The nineteenth-century view that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause did not apply to states' voting restrictions is confirmed in contemporary case law.
See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1875) ("Previous to this amendment, there
was no constitutional guaranty against this discrimination: now there is. ... [T]he [Fifteenth]
(A]mendment has invested the citizens of the United States with a new constitutional right
which is within the protecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from
discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.").
203. Arguably, a textualist-originalist argument, unlike the argument from original
intent, might well come to the opposite conclusion. Consider Robert Bork's textualistoriginalist argument that because "equal protection" means no segregation, the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits segregation even though the amendment's framers intended to leave
racial segregation intact. See BORK, supm note 189, at 81-82.
204. See, e.g., Harper,383 U.S. 663; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
205. 418 U.S. at 41-42.
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Amendment's exceptions to the Reduction in Representation
penalty, in and of itself, meaningfully distinguishes felony
disenfranchisement from "those other state limitations on the
franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause."206 Unlike other voting restrictions, "[T]he exclusion of
felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 027
Here Richardson does seem to be making a textual argument,
perhaps in response to the dissent's point that other voting restrictions
that the Reconstruction framers apparently approved have since been
deemed to violate equal protection. The majority acknowledges the
structural separateness of the Reduction in Representation Clause and
its "other crime" exception. Nevertheless, it "is as much a part of the
The Amendment's
Amendment as any of the other sections., 20
reference exempting disenfranchisement for "other crime" is part of
the constitutional text and "how it became a part of the Amendment is
less important than what it says and what it means."2" At least
implicitly, the Court seems to be singling out the express approval of
criminal disenfranchisement as setting that practice apart from other
voting qualifications that the Amendment's adopters likely approved.
For instance, lengthy residence requirements were common
before, and for many years after, the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment. A requirement of one year's residence before voting was
in place in eighteen states and fourteen others had requirements of six
months' residence.210 On the historical evidence, then, there is every
reason to assume that those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment
regarded such residency requirements as legitimate, or at least, as
constitutionally permissible. Nevertheless, more than a century after
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, and just four years before
Richardsonwas decided, the Supreme Court struck down Tennessee's
one-year residence qualification for voting as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause."
What then is the difference between the constitutional status of
Even
criminal disenfranchisement and residence requirements?
assuming that the express exemption of criminal disenfranchisement
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id at 54.
Id.
Id.at 55.
Id.

210.

ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT To VOTE:

DEMOCRACY INTHE UNITED STATES 329-31, tbl.A-9 (2000).
211. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972).
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from the Reduction in Representation penalty is a special, extra
powerful kind of evidence of approbation, why should that place
criminal disenfranchisement in a class by itself when other reliable
evidence that certain voting disqualifications were considered
acceptable can be disregarded? Here, without directly arguing it,
Richanon does suggest a performative status change enacted for
criminal disenfranchisement by vb-ue of the constitutional text-in
and of itself-and not just because of what that text reveals about the
"understanding of those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, as
reflected in the express language of § 2."212
So, the main analysis in Richardson flows directly from an
attempt to confirm the intentions of the Reconstruction framers and
ratifiers as evidenced by the express exemption of criminal
disenfranchisement from reduction in representation. The Court
engages in a fairly extensive review of the legislative history and
broader historic context of the Fourteenth Amendment, including some
contemporary federal statutes. Nevertheless, though the argument
from intent takes center stage, in some way the perceived performative
effect of the text itself, independent of its adopters' understanding,
plays a part in the Court's rationale for singling out criminal
disenfranchisement as invulnerable to the constitutional argument that
brought down other voter qualifications that likely were thought
unexceptionable at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was passed.
There is in Richardson's search for original intent, combined with the
"affirmative sanction" point, an echo of the county election boards'
confusion about the evidentiary or performative power of legal text.
B.

The CourtsofAppeals'FetishisdcUse of Richardson

In a series of recent rulings, courts of appeals have ascribed
increasing power to Richardson'stextualist aspect, while the Supreme
Court's exegesis of the Reconstruction framers' intent regarding
criminal disenfranchisement has faded into obscurity. Though most of
the analysis in Richardson focuses on the intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment's adopters, it is the Amendment's textual reference to
criminal disenfranchisement-in and of itself-that federal courts
have emphasized. Particularly after Hunter ruled that intentionally
racially discriminatory criminal disenfranchisement violates the Equal
Protection Clause, Richardson cannot stand for a bar to all constitutional, let alone statutory, challenges to criminal voting bans.
212. 418 U.S. at 54.
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Nevertheless, the courts of appeals have extended Richardson's
holding to block challenges to felony disenfranchisement's racial
dilution effects under the federal VRA. Picking up the textualist thread
in Richardson's primarily intentionalist rationale, the courts of appeals
in effect hold that the unique textual reference to criminal disenfranchisement in the Fourteenth Amendment transforms the constitutional
status of felony disenfranchisement.
The recent cases are not a straightforward application of
Richardson's precedent. In the first place, the courts of appeals'
opinions are statutory interpretations of the VRA. Each holds that the
Act's prohibition on any "voting qualification" that "results in a denial
or abridgement of the right ... to vote on account of race" does not

reach felony disenfranchisement's racial vote dilution.213 Richardson
and the exemption of criminal disenfranchisement from the Reduction
in Representation Clause, comes into play in an ostensibly secondary
fashion. But when all is said and done, the opinions all rest to one
extent or another on the explicit constitutional reference to criminal
disenfranchisement that Richardson first highlighted. They conclude
"that felon disenfranchisement somehow differs from other voting
qualifications because the power of the states to disqualify from voting
those convicted of crimes is explicitly set forth in § 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."2 14
The circuit courts all focus on Richardson's reading of an
"affirmative sanction" of felony disenfranchisement in the Fourteenth
Amendment.215 Ignoring Richardson's analysis of evidence outside the
constitutional text, they point to what they variously characterize as the
explicit constitutional
"express
approval," 216
Constitution's
2 17
recognition," and "explicit approval given felon disenfranchisement
213. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
214. Sinmons H1,575 E3d 24, 53 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
215. FarrakhanIV 623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[ljndeed, felon disenfranchisement has an affirmative sanction in the Fourteenth Amendment."); Hayden III, 594 F.3d
150, 164 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[A] state may constitutionally exclude convicted felons from the
franchise because § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides an 'affirmative sanction' for
such exclusion."); Sirmmons I, 575 F.3d at 32 ("'[T]he exclusion of felons from the vote has
an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment."' (quoting Richadon,418 U.S.
at 54)); Johnson 11 405 F3d 1214, 1228-29 (11th Cir. 2005) ("'[T]he exclusion of felons
from the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment."' (quoting
Richardson,418 U.S. at 54)).
216. Simmonsf,575 F3d at 33.
217. FarrakhanIff 359 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(denial of petition for reh'g en banc).
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provisions in the Constitution."" In this light the words "or other
crime" in the Reduction in Representation Clause confer a special
protected status on criminal disenfranchisement that extends beyond
the command to exempt these voting bans from the penalty of reduced
congressional representation.
Unlike Richardson,the circuit courts' textualism is context-free.219
Responding to the fact that the reference to criminal disenfranchisement occurs in a separate section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
apart from the Equal Protection Clause, Richardson used an analysis
of intent to make the link between them.220 The courts of appeals,
nevertheless, refrain from any significant intentionalist reasoning.
The Eleventh Circuit, en banc, in an opinion authored by Judge
Phyllis Kravitch, begins its discussion of the VRA claim by stating
flatly: "Felon disenfranchisement laws are unlike other voting
qualifications."22' To be sure, the court offers historical and policy
reasons for that distinction, arguing that these voting bans are "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history" and "a punitive device stemming from
criminal law," and pointing out that every state but two has some form
of felony disenfranchisement.222 But the core of the distinction, and
thus of the conclusion that the VRA does not (and cannot) reach felony
disenfranchisement, is a view that the presence of the words "other
crime" in the Reduction in Representation Clause sets criminal voting
218. Hayden 11 449 E3d 305, 316 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc). There have been
dissenters in every one of these decisions, and three circuits have reheard the cases en banc.
FarrakhanIV 623 F3d at 993; Muntaqim v. Coombe, 449 F3d 371 (2d Cir. 2006); Johnson
I, 405 E3d 1214. The Ninth Circuit allowed a VRA suit to go forward through a panel
opinion that did not construe Richardson, eventually granting summary judgment to
plaintiffs, before that judgment was overturned en banc. Farrakhan1,338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir.
2003). The court then denied en banc review over a seven-judge dissent, authored by Judge
Kozinski, who declared that "felon disenfranchisement laws are explicitly endorsed by the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment." FarrakhanII 359 F3d at 1121. After remand to the trial
court and a second appellate panel's grant of summary judgment to the disenfranchised
plaintiffs, en banc was granted. The en banc court refused to apply the "disparate impact"
analysis used in VRA cases to felony disenfranchisement. Instead, the court dismissed the
case finding that, given the Fourteenth Amendment's "affirmative sanction" of criminal
disenfranchisement, plaintiffs' evidence of racial disparities in the criminal justice system was
insufficient. According to the en banc majority, only a showing "that the criminal justice
system is infected by ntendonaldiscrimination or that the felon disenfranchisement law was
enacted with such intent" could support a VRA challenge. FarrakhanIV 623 F3d at 993.
219. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of OnignalIntent in Statutory Construction,
11 HARv.J.L.& PuB. PoL'y 59,65 (1988).
220. Textualism generally recognizes the importance of the context in which language
is interpreted. ScADA, supra note 16, at 37 ("In textual interpretation, context is
everything.").
221. Johnsonl, 405 E3d at 1228.
222. Id.
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bans apart: "As the Court explained in Richardson,'the exclusion of
felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in [S]ection 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a sanction which was not present in the case
223
of the other restrictions on the franchise which were invalidated."'
That is, the textual reference performs a self-executing protection:
"Most important, Florida's discretion to deny the vote to convicted

felons is fixed by the text of § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 224
Two years later, the Second Circuit, en banc, rejected a VRA
dilution claim against felony disenfranchisement on a similar theory.
The court explained that "[t]he starting point for our analysis is the
explicit approval given felon disenfranchisement provisions in the
Constitution."225 After quoting the "except for participation h7
rebellion, or other crime" exception from the Reduction in
Representation Clause, the Second Circuit characterized Richardsonas
holding that "as a result of this language, felon disenfranchisement
provisions are presumptively constitutional."226
In 2010, the First Circuit turned back a VRA challenge, "against
the backdrop of the Constitution's express approval of felon
For the First Circuit, the "fatal flaw"
disenfranchisement provisions.
in the plaintiffs' case was the failure to understand that "[f]elon
disenfranchisement statutes are not like all other voting qualifications." 28 According to that court, the difference is that felony-voting
bans are "deeply rooted in our history, in our laws, and in our
Constitution."29 Other voting qualifications, however, also existed
before the Civil War and at the time of the Reconstruction
Amendments, including, for example, property requirements, which
the Court later had no trouble striking down under equal protection.2"o
So the key place where felony-voting bans are uniquely "rooted"
appears to be the Reduction in Representation Clause. This is where
the First Circuit began, that is, by assuming that "[t]he power of the
states to disqualify from voting those convicted of crimes is explicitly
set forth in §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment," and by quoting
Richardson's"affirmative sanction" language.2 M
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id at 1228-29 (quoting Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974)).
Id at 1228.
Haydenl 449 E3d 305, 316 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id.
Simmons l, 575 E3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2009).
Id.at 34.
Id.
See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
Sunmonsll 575 E3d at 32.
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Most recently, the Ninth Circuit, en banc, dismissed another VRA
challenge to felony disenfranchisement. The brief per curiam opinion
notes that "[t]hree

circuits ...

have ...

concluded that felon

disenfranchisement laws are categorically exempt from challenges
brought under [S]ection 2 of the VRA. 232 The Ninth Circuit took a
different approach, which nevertheless renders felony disenfranchisement uniquely immune to VRA scrutiny. Instead of explicitly ruling
that criminal disenfranchisement laws are not subject to VRA
challenges, the court imposed a special requirement that to challenge
criminal voting bans under the Act, plaintiffs must prove either "that
the criminal justice system is infected by htentionaldiscrimination or
that the felon disenfranchisement law was enacted with such intent."233
It is interesting that the en banc Ninth Circuit ultimately declined
to adopt a categorical exclusion for felony disenfranchisement based
on its "affirmative sanction" in the constitution, particularly because a
dissent to a previous denial of en banc, signed by six judges of the
court, advanced that very analysis. Indeed, this dissenting opinion, by
Judge Alex Kozinski, which dates back to 2004, was cited approvingly
in two of the other circuits' decisions.234 Like the other opinions, Judge
Kozinski's starts from the premise that extending the VRA to reach
felony disenfranchisement laws is constitutionally suspect because
"[u]nlike any other voting qualification, felon disenfranchisement laws
are explicitly endorsed by the text of the Fourteenth Amendment."2 "
The opinion discusses other issues, including the legislative history of
the VRA and the evidence in the record. But the most "fundamental
problem" with the case is said to be the fact that felony disenfranchisement "is a very widespread historical practice that has been
accorded explicit constitutional recognition in § 2 of the Fourteenth
236
Amendment," a proposition for which the opinion cites Richardson.
The circuit courts have transformed Richardson's originalist
analysis. Abandoning the Supreme Court's emphasis on original intent
and context, they focus instead on the simple presence of the words "or
other crime" in the Fourteenth Amendment. In these opinions, the
Amendment's affirmative textual reference confers a special status on
the referent-criminal disenfranchisement policies-that immunizes
232.
233.
234.
n.40 (11th
235.
236.

FaRrakhanIV623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir.2010).
Id.
Hayden fI, 449 F.3d 305, 323 (2d Cir. 2006); Johnson 11 405 F.3d 1214, 1234,
Cir. 2005); FarrakhanH, 359 E3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
arakhanf,359E3dat1121.
Id. (quoting Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 928 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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those policies from constitutional attack and from legislative reform.
This is not an analysis based on original intent. It is an extreme form
of textualism stripped of context.
Indeed, we might call this context-free interpretive style
"hypertextualism," because it works something like highlighted textual
links online. One need not actually decode the meaning of hypertext
to call up a whole area of content assigned to the specific highlighted
phrase and utterly removed from the context of the original
reference.237 Similarly, in the circuit courts' interpretation of the
Reduction in Representation Clause, the words "or other crime" are
like a hypertextual link that generates a certain kind of reaction simply
by virtue of their presence. On this approach, by singling out, or, yes,
hihhgh ng, criminal disenfranchisement through the hypertextual
phrase, "or other crime," the Fourteenth Amendment's text inscribes a
hypertextual pathway that generates unique constitutional protection
for criminal disenfranchisement, without any consideration of the
understanding of the text's original authors and ratifiers.238 Hypertextual power transforms the constitutional status of felony disenfranchisement. In this interpretation of legal language, the constitutional
document performatively erects a kind of special protection for
criminal disenfranchisement-even if that protection is contrary to the
understanding of the document's authors.
This is a legal version of those fables in which some superhuman
agent grants a short-sighted mortal wish, and we watch as the
unwitting recipient struggles not to be undone by this windfall of
power, and often fails. So, for example, King Midas wishes that
everything he touches will turn to gold and-against his most heartfelt
intentions-transforms his beloved daughter into an inanimate hunk of
metal when he embraces her. In the hypertextualist interpretation of
Richardson-and in county election officials' request for "some
document" to reenfranchise a former convict-legal text brims with a
237. It might be argued that hypertextual links in cybertext have precisely the opposite
connotation-that is, they provide greater context for the linked text. In one sense this is
undeniably true, but the point here is the power of the links' creator to determine that
context-and to associate selected meanings with the central text in a way that makes those
meanings seem part of the text, rather than the work of the link maker.
238. It is interesting to consider whether the cultural context of actual online hypertext
is contributing to the rise of a new hypertextualist approach to constitutional interpretation.
Online readers are now familiar with the experience of text that reacts to merely passing over
it with a cursor by opening up whole new areas of text and moving the reader into whole new
realms of content. Perhaps this fosters a sense of a more general capacity of text to trigger
connections contextually, or even switches, to meaning without going through any expressive
interpretive connection to the original phrase.
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superhuman power to perform such unlooked-for transformations, and
lacks the humanizing limit of expressive intent.
The circuit courts' hypertextualist protection of felony disenfranchisement echoes the election officials' insistence that individuals who
have lost their voting rights because of criminal convictions cannot be
reenfranchised without some positive enfranchising text to counter the
original transformation accomplished via performative text. In both
cases, written legal text's resistance to erasure, a quality that makes
documents powerful evidence of intent, undermines the authors' intent
when treated as a performative force. In the case of the election
officials, the idea that a status change from voting citizen to
disenfranchised convict that is accomplished through documentary
rituals must likewise be undone with documents has the effect of
preventing people who have completed their criminal sentences from
regaining their voting rights, even in states like New York and
Missouri, whose laws on paper limit felony disenfranchisement to the
time of a sentence. In the more rarified documentary context of
constitutional interpretation, it appears again that an express textual
endorsement of criminal disenfranchisement confers a kind of
acontextual protection that overrides the understanding of the text's
creators.
C

DocunentaryDisenfhndisement,Racial Vote Dilution,and the
Supreme Courth OigaistAnalysishi Richardson

The circuit courts' shift from Richardson's original intent analysis
to the acontextual approach I call "hypertextualism" may seem neither
here nor there. As long as Richardson protects felony disenfranchisement from challenge, who cares how it justifies that protection? Here
is why the analysis matters: Under Richardson's own original intent
rationale, if the racial dilution effects are significant, felony
disenfranchisement may be constitutionally vulnerable.
Without Richardson's blessing, felony disenfranchisement would
almost surely flunk the Supreme Court's modem voting rights test of
constitutionality. Generally speaking, however, originalist constitutional interpretations are not susceptible to being undermined by
changing social circumstances. Thus, constitutional standards for
voting rights overall may evolve, but under Richardson, felony
disenfranchisement is the fly trapped in the amber of the
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Reconstruction Amendments' original understanding.239 Recognizing
the racial and political effects of documentary disenfranchisement,
however, suggests a new way to challenge felony disenfranchisement
on Richardson's own terms-but only if the courts stay true to those
intentionalist terms.24 0

The Supreme Court's exemption of felony disenfranchisement
from the usual strict scrutiny of voting bans is based on the reference
to criminal disenfranchisement in the Reduction in Representation
Clause. Under the Fourteenth Amendment's new command to count
all citizens in determining a state's congressional representation, the
Southern states gained additional seats in Congress. The Reduction in
Representation Clause was designed to keep ex-Confederate states
from changing election results in races for those newly created
congressional posts by thinning the ranks of African-American voters.
In other words, after the war, Southern states gained additional seats
that they could fill with ex-Confederate Democrats by disenfranchising African Americans, which, under the original understanding of
239. Cf Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 76 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("But
'constitutional concepts of equal protection are not immutably frozen like insects trapped in
Devonian amber."' (quoting Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 E2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972))).
240. Some official practices that render ostensibly temporary disenfranchisement
permanent may be vulnerable constitutionally even if facially permanent disenfranchisement
remains constitutionally protected. Even if the Court were to find that Richardson continues
to allow states to practice felony disenfranchisement, no matter what the racial and political
consequences, once a state permits people with felony convictions to vote, they may have the
same fundamental right to vote as other citizens. Thus states' arbitrary overenforcement of
felony disenfranchisement laws gives rise to a due process claim.
States that want to defend differential registration practices for ex-offenders have an
argument that Richardsonforecloses any equal protection claim by a person with a felony
conviction or, at the very least, means that such claims are never subject to strict scrutiny.
Advocates who want to attack additional registration procedures for reenfranchising people
with felony convictions would argue that voting rights are irreducibly fundamental. On this
theory, when a state grants voting rights to a citizen, it grants something that cannot be
reduced below a certain level of constitutional protection.
We might think of this as "the voting rights as pregnancy model." Just as, in the old
saying, you cannot be just a little bit pregnant, you cannot be just a little bit enfranchised.
Like pregnancy, the right to vote is all or nothing. You either have it or you do not. And if
you have it, you have got the same thing that everyone else with voting rights has got. As the
Supreme Court explained in Bush v Gore, "Having once granted the right to vote on equal
terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote
over that of another." 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000). On this view, just because under
Richardsonthe state may deny the franchise on account of felony conviction does not mean
that someone with a felony conviction who retains or regains the right to vote has less than a
fundamental right to vote. On this view, once New York decided to restore voting rights for
people with felony convictions upon completion of their sentences, those potential registrants'
voting rights are entitled to the same constitutional protections as the voting rights of any
other New Yorker.
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the Equal Protection Clause, they were still free to do. The paradoxical
effect would be to give the losers of the war a new political advantage.
The Reduction in Representation Clause was designed to fix that
paradox. The Clause ensured that the representatives states sent to the
federal government would either reflect the voting preferences of the
state's entire population or be reduced to reflect the reduced population
that was allowed to elect them. If a state diluted its voting population
in a racial manner, it would not be able to skew the composition of the
national legislature to over represent the part of its citizenry it allowed
to vote.
As Richardson recognized, the Reduction in Representation
Clause, where the exemption for criminal disenfranchisement appears,
was designed to neutralize the political effects of widespread dilution
of African-American voting power: "[T]he framers of the Amendment
were primarily concerned with the effect of reduced representation
upon the States, rather than with the two forms of disenfranchisement
which were exempted from that consequence."241 In Ricardson, the
Court held that the exception for criminal voting bans from the remedy
of reduced representation imposed for other types of disenfranchisement also justified exempting criminal disenfranchisement from the
That
Court's usually strict review of voting qualifications.
justification, however, is questionable if criminal-disenfranchisement
policies are now generating the very harm that Richardson
acknowledges the Reduction in Representation Clause sought to
prevent. If permanent disenfranchisement's dilution of AfricanAmerican voting power is affecting the composition of government,
then rather than an exception, criminal disenfranchisement is now a
cause of exactly the kind of racial and partisan vote dilution the
Fourteenth Amendment framers sought to forestall with the Reduction
in Representation Clause. Arguably, then, on Richardson's own
original intent reasoning, there is no more "affirmative sanction" for
this sort of voting ban.242

241. 418 U.S. at 43. In a thoughtful comment, Katherine Shaw argued that Florida's
then-permanent (on the books) disenfranchisement of ex-offenders instantiated just the kind
of vote dilution on a national scale that the framers of Section 2 were attempting to prevent,
and as such violates the fundamental voting rights of voters in other states. See Katherine
Shaw, Comment, Invoking the Penalty: How Floridak Felon Disenflanchisement Law
Violates the Constitutional Requirement of Population Equality mn Congressional
Representation,and What To DoAboutli; 100 Nw U. L. REV. 1439 (2006). I am indebted to
Thomas Geoghegan for bringing this argument to my attention.
242. 418 U.S. at 54.
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Of course, as an abstract proposition, it is conceivable that the
Reconstruction framers wanted to protect states' criminal disenfranchisement policies at all costs-even if they resulted in the particular
racial-partisan vote dilution that the Representation Clause was
enacted to prevent. With no evidence of why felony disenfranchisement was exempted, however, a reasonable intentionalist reading
would interpret that exemption in concert with the original purpose of
protecting the representative nature of national government, rather than
insist on maintaining an interpretation that contravenes that purpose on
the theory that there might be other unspoken reasons for the original
exemption. In fact, the legislative history examined in Richardson
indicates that the Reconstruction Amendment's framers were
concerned about the possibility that by broadening criminal
disenfranchisement, states might use criminal voting bans to dilute
African-American voting power.24 3
When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, criminal
disenfranchisement was generally limited to felonies at common law,
that is, a short list of capital crimes. This narrow type of common law
felony disenfranchisement would never have the vote dilution potential
addressed in the Reduction in Representation Clause. As Richardson
points out, the Reconstruction Act of 1867, which established the
conditions on which former Confederate states would be readmitted to
Congress, specifies that delegates to state constitutional conventions
shall be elected by all eligible voters excluding only those
"disenfianchised for particioation r the rebellion or for felony at
common law."2" Likewise, the readmission acts that in 1868 and 1870
brought the ex-Confederate states into the Union specified that
representation in Congress was subject to the "fundamental condition"
that the states' constitutions never be amended to deprive citizens of
the right to vote "except as a punishment for such crimes as are now
felonies at common law."245 The Reconstruction framers apparently
243. The argument that Section 2's exception of criminal disenfranchisement should
be limited to felonies at common law was made forcefully by John R. Cosgrove in his article
Four New Arguments Against the Constitutionality of Felony Disenfmnchisement, 26 T.
JEFFERSON L. REv 157 (2004). Cosgrove, along with the ACLU, later brought a challenge to
Arizona's criminal disenfranchisement state on this ground (among others). See Harvey v.
Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2010). A Ninth Circuit panel, which included Judge
Kozinski and retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, rejected this argument, asserting that
there is "absolutely no support for the proposition that the word 'crimes' [in the Reduction in
Representation Clause] meant 'common-law felonies' at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment's ratification." Id.at 1075.
244. 418 U.S. at 49 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
245. Id.at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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foresaw the potential that criminal disenfranchisement might be
broadened, as it has been today, and indicated their intent to prevent,
rather than to promote, such a practice.
The Reduction in Representation Clause is basically a device to
counter the results of racial vote dilution. The potential dilution of the
African-American vote brought about by permanent disenfranchisement of those convicted in the war on crime arguably threatens to
produce something quite like the skewed electoral results that the
Reduction in Representation Clause was created to prevent. Indeed,
Uggen and Manza contend that Florida's permanent felony
disenfranchisement was enough to shift the outcome of the 2000
presidential election, as well as several previous senatorial elections.246
Thus, even on Richardson's own original intent reasoning, the dilution
effects of states' felony disenfranchisement laws may no longer be
constitutionally protected.
Under the hypertextualist approach in the courts of appeals,
however, felony disenfranchisement could remain protected even while
accomplishing effects directly contrary to the intention of the specific
constitutional clause in which the protective words appear. Stripped of
its intention, constitutional text is like a mark that cannot be erased.
Just as the would-be voters in St. Louis with felony convictions were
not like other registrants because their disenfranchised status has been
fixed by the disqualifying code next to their names on the voter
registration rolls, felony disenfranchisement policies are "unlike other
voting qualifications," because of their express exemption in the
Reduction in Representation Clause.247 Challenges under the Equal
Protection Clause-and under the VRA's enforcement of the Fifteenth
Amendment-are powerless against these laws because they have
been transformed by an "affirmative sanction" in another part of the
constitutional text. Like the county election officials' sense that some
other document is needed to reverse individual felony disenfranchisement, the circuit courts' performative approach would require some
additional positive constitutional text to undo the disenfranchising
effect of the exemption of criminal disenfranchisement in the
Reduction in Representation Clause.2 48 No argument about the
246. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 1, at 191-97.
247. Johnsonll,405F.3d1214,1228 (llthCir. 2005).
248. Ironically, there is a strong argument that just such positive text exists-the
Fifteenth Amendment. See Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction,Felon Disenfianchisement,and
the Right To Vote: Did the FiReenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment?, 92 GEo. L.J. 259 (2004); see also Hayden H!,449 F.3d 305, 350-52 (2d Cir.
2006) (Parker, J., dissenting); Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y University
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intended expressive meaning or the original understanding of that
clause will reverse its performative effects.
D

DocumentaryDisenfianchisementandDocumentary
Constitutionalism

The conflict between legal text's expressive commands and
performative effects might appear irrational and disruptive to a wellfunctioning legal system. At another level, however, it may be
indispensable to our understanding of the relationship between legal
language and law's distinctive institutional power. The story of
documentary disenfranchisement highlights how legal language
exaggerates a characteristic of all language, namely, its dual capacity to
both instantiate and overcome the will of authors. Law depends to
some extent on the power of written text to fix a lawmaker's intent.
But, though it is confounding and unpredictable, the power of written
text to evade intentions is at least equally central to our concept of a
legal document. The Constitution, in particular, embodies the dream
of words that escape and overrun the will of individuals. The very idea
of a "government of laws, and not of men" suggests a transcending
role for legal text.249 For how else will the law be something that can
separate from, and if necessary resist and overcome, the will of the
individuals who make, interpret, enforce, and follow it?
Written text encodes objective meaning in more ways than one.
Writing literally creates an object that embodies meaning. The law
objectified as document provides something material, a model, in a
way, of the objective separation needed for an authoritative rule of law
that constrains its human subjects.25 In this regard, legal documents
may do for our justice system what Clifford Geertz observes the
Negara state rituals did for Balinese society: "[C]ast into sensible
School of Law and the University of N.C. School of Law Center for Civil Rights as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 E3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 017260), 2005 WL 5011970.
249. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
250. Note that, as an object, written text also embodies a special kind of permanence.
Unlike all other physical objects, written text never changes through use. Other objects
betray the patterns of their use-corners are rubbed down, grooves erased, the places where
hands have held them are worn smooth. Indeed, certain objects disappear entirely as they are
not only used, but used up. However, documents have an uncanny ability to withstand all
such mutation and depletion. Of course the paper on which they are written may yellow and
disintegrate and the print may fade, but the text itself is unchanged. And because of the
possibility of copying a document exactly, the text can be repeatedly renewed and retain its
original form forever. Nowadays electronic documents do not even require that copying step
to withstand the effects of use and time.
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form a concept of what, together, they were supposed to make of
themselves: an illustration of the power of grandeur to organize the

world."251
In the more familiar sense, documents impart objective meaning
to law by eliminating conflicts about what words are to be interpreted.
But the story of documentary disenfranchisement, with election
officials' demands for "some" documents to counter written marks of
disqualification and courts' focus on the Fourteenth Amendment's
"express" use of the words "or other crime" unmoored from contextual
expressive meaning, reminds us that the concretizing and objectifying
quality of written language has an irrational aspect as well.
Fixing law in a particular semantic formula may discourage
restatements that move law closer to an interpreter's own predilections.
But, at the same time writing prevents restatements that might keep a
law's meaning more in line with its authors' original intentions or
closer to the way the law was understood at the time of its adoption.
Without specific text in between (as it were) legislation and
interpretation, the interpreter would be more free to investigate the
context in which the law was declared. The hardened written scriptwhich appears identical across time and place-fights context, not
only the "evolving" context of the times and places in which it is
interpreted, but the original context in which it was created.252 As
George Taylor puts it, "[T]ext's linguistic signs retain their vitality
independent of any authorial plan that inspired them."253 Without this
unchanging textual object on which to gaze, we might find it both
easier and more important to look into the world in which the law was
made in order to determine its meaning. Indeed, it may be that written
text is more a mirror than a window-a set of symbols that will
inevitably read back to us the meanings that our own time and culture
associates with them, rather than the meanings that the text's authors
and original readers would find there.

251. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, NEGARA: THE THEATRE STATE INNINETEENTH-CENTURY BALI
102 (1980).
252. Moreover, as Victoria Nourse points out, attitudes about the relationship of legal
text to legal rights change over time, so that it may well be that legal rights documents written
in times past were written and adopted by individuals who did not anticipate that the text
would be regarded as the source, as well as the description, of the rights at stake. SeeVictoria
F Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The UntoldHistory ofSubstantive Due Processand the
Idea ofFundamentalRights,97 CALF. L. REv. 751, 752 (2009).
253. George H. Taylor, Legal Interpretation. The Window of the Text as Tminsparent,
Opaque,or Translucen 10 NEv L.J. 700, 712 (2010).
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Our legal culture may not be able to do without the performative
power of legal documents. I have described how that power can evade,
overcome, or distort intentions. But without some performative power,
legal text (whether a constitutional amendment or a judgment of
conviction) would lack its characteristic capacity to transform social
status through verbal declarations-to make it so by saying it."
Perhaps the moral is that, like King Midas, when we leverage words'
potential to transcend their authors' wishes, we let loose a
transformational force whose effects we cannot imagine, let alone
control, in advance. Less dramatically, as Justice Rehnquist once
admonished (indeed the same year he wrote the majority opinion in
Richardson), in reaping the benefits of legal language, we may have to

"take the bitter with the sweet."255
The realist critique of doctrinal reasoning sprang from doubts
about the power of legal texts to constrain legal decision making, as
did the realists' call to study the law in action. Having falsified the
formalist claim that texts determine results, the original realists
proceeded to conclude that legal texts were unimportant for
understanding how decision makers reached outcomes. The story of
documentary disenfranchisement suggests rather that legal texts do
constrain decision makers to some extent, but not in ways that
necessarily vindicate the formal-doctrinal view of our legal system.
This is realism, too, for it continues to reject the idea that a legal text
controls a legal determination, in an independent, substantive sense
apart from the responses of individual human decision makers to that
text's meaning. But it is also, in a sense, a formalist view, for it
acknowledges a certain irreducible power of legal forms.256 Written
legal text-and documents themselves-may generate a predisposition
to certain outcomes and understandings and a resistance to others, at
least among those who are familiar with and identified with a legal
system or legal culture that produces those forms.
I have argued that the decisions of both local election
administrators and federal judges may be explained in part by a
common notion that putting something in writing, "documenting" it,
not only evidences legal status but constitutes or reinforces that status
and, in effect, makes it more difficult to change. Now the (original)
254. See AusTIN, supra note 17, at 6-7.
255. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974).
256. Thus my account responds to what Victoria Nourse describes as one of the
challenges facing new legal realism, to explore how the "simultaneous discourses" of politics
and law "imbibe, cross, and come to constitute each other." Nourse, supranote 252, at 792.
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realists would say that when election officials and federal judges
explain and defend their decisions in terms of the power of
documentary text to create and entrench a disenfranchised status, they
are either dissembling or deluded. The real origins of the legal
decisions that refuse to change that status are some combination of
personal, political, cultural, and social factors that have nothing to do
with the documentary text they either demand or interpret.
I share the realist view that both election officials and federal
judges are likely influenced by the widely accepted understanding that
the criminally convicted may be excluded from the usual treatment and
privileges accorded U.S. citizens. Where I depart from the realists-at
least the original realists-is their further conclusion that legal
decision makers' attitudes to text are therefore illusory and
insignificant. I am suggesting instead that when we ask what factors
go into a legal decision, we should not overlook the possibility that a
legal-cultural prioritization of written legal documents is one of them.
It may well be that the refusal to register people disenfranchised by
convictions, or to entertain their vote dilution claims, is driven by
social attitudes, political ideology, partisan interest, and personal
values. Even if that is the case, election officials' and judges'
perceptions that the disenfranchised status of the criminally convicted
is "fixed by the text"" is part of what gives that disenfranchised status
a particular kind of power.2" For better or worse, there is something
definitional and peculiar about the power our legal system ascribes to
documentary text. Rather than taking documentary text's effect for
granted as a mechanical determinant of legal outcomes or dismissing it
as illusory cover for the realreasons for those outcomes, we should try
to become better acquainted with the ways this documentary power
shapes and misshapes our legal system at a number of different levels.

V.

EPILOGUE:
WORDS

A STORY ABOUT LEGAL PRACTICE AND LEGAL

One day about a year before we did the first interviews with New
York election officials, the phone rang in my office at the Brennan
Center, where I was busy working on a brief for a lawsuit challenging
Florida's permanent disenfranchisement of everyone convicted of a
felony. The person on the phone was not calling about Florida. This
was a local call from a volunteer voting-rights advocate in New York
257. Johnson IJg 405 E3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005).
258. See Nourse & Shaffer, supm note 22, 123-25.
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City, where the laws on the books only suspend voting rights during a
prison sentence and on parole.259 My caller explained that he was
doing a voter registration drive in Harlem and was encountering a
repeated response from men there: "I can't register," they told him,
"I've got a conviction."
I was not particularly interested in this problem. It was nowhere
near as momentous as the litigation in Florida. It did not involve
important issues of constitutional interpretation; it was just a dumb
mistake. Impatiently, I explained to my caller that under New York's
statute, the men he was trying to register were eligible to register
unless they were in prison (which obviously they were not) or on
parole. He said he had asked them about that, and they were not
parolees. "Well, then they're just wrong," I said. "You tell them that
they're wrong, if they've done their time and they're off parole, they
can register and vote in New York."
In retrospect, it seems incredible that I did not even think to ask
what might have made these men believe they were barred from voting
in New York, but I did not. Satisfied that I had straightened out a
pretty obvious legal misconception, I hung up. It would be months
before I realized that I was the one making the dumb mistake, and that
the men my caller was trying to register were more expert than I in the
practice, and, in a sense, the text, of New York's felony disenfranchisement law. And it is only now, years after we lost that Florida case,
that I realize that what those men knew about the law in New York
might have changed the constitutional argument in Florida.
I would like to think that if I got a call like that today, I would
know better-that now I would have the sense to look past my own
interpretation of a legal text to observe the complexity, and
indeterminacy, of its implementation. But I have my doubts. If there
is one thing that the story of documentary disenfranchisement points
out, it is the way legal experts tend to be blinded by legal text and to
make assumptions about implementation that are often illusory. Legal
academics are very used to the idea of textual indeterminacy as a
matter of judicial interpretation. Oddly, though, we sometimes act as
though the same constitutional and statutory texts, which require so
much interpretation to decide questions of their broad normative
application and meaning, are self-defining in terms of their local
administration. Similarly, we tend to treat the meaning of other sorts

259. N.Y ELEC. LAW § 5-106(2) (McKinney 2011).
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of legal texts (registration forms, identification documents, licenses,
database lists of eligible voters) as self-defining.
Much has been made of the singularity of the Constitution as a
founding document with complex cultural meanings that affect the
modes of its interpretation. But other sorts of legal text partake of both
a similar ability to constitute some kind of shift in social reality and an
openness to interpretation. If there is a difference in this sense
between the Constitution and a mark by a person's name in a state
voter database, it is a difference of scope and process, not substance.
Both texts perform the creation of legal rights and limits. The story of
documentary disenfranchisement points out the need to recognize that
the indeterminacy and constitutive power we are used to ascribing to
judges' constitutional interpretations may be present in the day-to-day
textual interpretations of local officials who implement more personal
and prosaic legal text-and that these two sorts of interpretation can
illuminate each other.

